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FOREWORD
In early 1976, the Canadian Association for the
Mentally Retarded (CAMR) requested provincial
associations for the mentally retarded to set up Task
Groups to consider legislative and legal matters
related to mental retardation, Interim reports from
the Task Groups were given at Regional Seminars in
June 1976 in preparation for final submission to
CAMR's National Conference on Law and Legislation,
(Ottawa, October, 1976).
Contained herein are the first monographs
resulting from the work of the Task Groups and other
resource people engaged by CAMR. The four monographs
in the series are:
- Community Residences: The Zoning Issue
- Estate Planning for the Parents of Mentally
Retarded Persons
- A Multi-Component Advocacy/Protection Schema
- Education for Retarded Children: Access?
Integration? Parent Participation?
The topic areas covered are only a beginning.
Readers of this series are encouraged to forward
to CAMR their reactions to the content of each of
the monographs so that improvements can be made.
A special note of appreciation must go to
Paul McLaughlin, consulting lawyer with CAMR, for his
work in editing some of the documents, writing and
reworking others. As well, this work could not have
been undertaken without the financial assistance
provided by the National Welfare Grants Directorate
of Health and Welfare Canada.
The Association Resources Division (which initiated
and directed the Task Groups, the Conference presenters
and the production of this series) encourages members
of associations to use the monographs as an opportunity
to become active in law reform on behalf of mentally
retarded people.
Peter Dill
Coordinator
Association Resources
Division

G. Allan Roeher
Executive Vice-President
Canadian Association for
the Mentally Retarded

INTRODUCTION
Much like everything else, human services in
technologically advanced and economically affluent nations
have undergone a process of evolution which has a certain
regularity, r epetitiveness, and therefore predictability.
Among these major phenomena in service system evolution are
( 1) increasing complexity; (2) a dramatic increase in
scientific knowledge, particularly in the area of social
psychology and organizational dynamics, which can have a
profound bearing on the maintenance or improvement of
service quality ; (3) introduction of technology into
service delivery , wi t h a concomitant threat to privacy, to
individualizati on, and possibly to other client rights;
(4) rising cos t s which contribute toward greater call, as
well a s gre ater need, for expenditure accountability; (5)
continuing of f ra gmentation of services; and (6) in many
instances, r i sing consumer dissatisfaction. These trends
or their asso ciated dynamics can fall into two categories:
those havin g a strong potential for jeopardizing the quality
of services, and those having the latent potential for
improving it. The fact that the above trends are apt to
jeopardize service quality, while also having strong promise
for improving it, make it very urgent that much more intense
and conscious effort be directed toward the institution of
an array of safeguards and other measures which are apt to
maintain or improve the quality of service.
However, while a vast amount of lip-service is paid to
the need for service quality and quality safeguards,
remarkably little is being done about it in a systemic;
sustained and actually effective fashion. After all, the
institution of quality safeguards is, in effect, a function
and expression of the process of change agentry, and human
service structures have many built-in resistances to the
change process. This is a fact which is often hard to
accept by service system administrators who not merely pay
lip-service to the institutionalization of the change
process, but who usually sincerely believe that they and
their agency are committed to innovation, to experimentation,
to adaptation, etc.
Yet ultimately, to use the language and concepts of
organizational dynamics, service delivery agencies are
essentially quasi-bureaucracies which require a great deal
of continuity and routine in their operation in order to
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function relatively efficiently. Change and continuity
are inherently opposed to each other, and while too
much change would result in chaos, there are extremely
few human service agencies that change as much as they
shouJ.d. This fact should be faced by service administrators
not with defensiveness, but with a certain sympathy and
understanding of the human condition, because agencies
ultimately are no more than collectivities of human beings
carrying out functions. Being human, they are inclined
to carry out functions with which they are familiar, from
which they receive rewards, and which do not inconvenience
them excessively--if at all.
Increased recognition of the needs and rights of
service consumers (indeed, of people who are not now such
consumers but ought to have the opportunity to be), coupled
with the aforementioned dissatisfaction with past service
patterns, plus probably some other conceptual and social
developments, has led to the rise of an advocacy movement.
This movement would give greater voice and power to
citizens, and even many workers within the service
establishment acknowledge that the inconvenience of being
confronted by advocacy that may be directed against
themselves is adaptive for themselves and their agencies.
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THE HISTORICAL-CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF ADVOCACY
A clearly conceptualized advocacy construct in the
human service context is relatively new. While advocacy
itself has always taken place, the clear formulation of
advocacy as a schema or system has a much more recent
history. Indeed, the novelty of a clearly conceptualized
advocacy approach and component in the human services
context is such that the very term "advocacy" can
scarcely be found in the human services literature prior
to approximately 1970. 1 vividly remember the time when
most people would stumble over the word trying to
pronounce it.

t

As is often the case, various circumstances,
including the needs of the times, can propel a concept
to wide public attention in a remarkably short period.
So it has been with the advocacy concept. However, when
this sort of thing happens, there is almost invariably
a great deal of confusion and distortion. People may be
exposed to a new word, may incorporate the word into
their vocabulary, but may not as yet have internalized a
cl.ear concept as to what the word is all about, or what
it stands for. So it is with the term and concept of
advocacy, much as · it is al.so with "normalization,"
"integration," "mainstreaming," "deinstitutional.ization,v
and others. As we proceed to delineate a global advocacy
system, it is useful . to review at least three ideological/
historical roots of the recent advocacy movement, and then
proceed to various definition issues.
One major contributor to the advocacy/protection
movement has been the Judea-Christi.an tradition. The
Old Testament is full of admonitions to protect the
lowly, the orphaned, the widow, etc. In the New
Testament, concern with the weak, sick, handicapped
and abandoned became even more central, and is
epitomized in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and
that of the sheep and the goats ("I was in prison, and
you visited me," etc.). Many people, despite their
flight from Judea-Christian denominations, still
idealize this altruistic orientation to the disadvantaged
or cast-off members of society.
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A second major tradition is that which has found
its way to us through Hegelian philosophy and its various
Marxist interpretations and applications. Often quite
unconsciously, the idea of the operation of mutually
opposed forces (as in thesis and antithesis) has
become widely accepted and adopted in the minds of people,
especially in various fields of social science and
social change that are concerned with social tensions
and conflict resolution. Within this ideological
tradition, advocacy is conceptualized as the antithesis
of an established power or interest (the thesis, or
vice versa) which is seen as detrimental to a person
or group--and in most instances an assumedly disadvantaged
group. Thus, we see many elements of the conflict
model in many advocacy approaches, and can often detect
its Marxist-Hegelian roots by its (not uncommonly
unconscious) vocabulary: class struggle, the people,
workers, masses, the enemy, oppressors, establishment,
aggression, reactionaries, liberation, power, the
cause, coalition, cadre, etc.
A third major intellectual tradition that has given
rise to the advocacy movement is the growing realization
in just the last few years that human organizations are
subject to certain laws, and that they operate with
certain sets of built-in dynamics which can scarcely
be overcome by individual efforts, and then only for
short periods of time, or for a limited number of
occasions, but not for most organizations most of the
time. Thus, through the study of complex social systems,
and especially the work of people such as J. Forrester,
we have come to recognize a number of distressing
realities:
1. Over the long run, organizations serve themselves
more than they serve any other purpose.
2. Excellence in complex social systems contexts
is most difficult to attain; and once attained, it is
subject to dynamics and stresses which make it extremely
unlikely that it will be maintained. In other words,
probabilistically, human institutions, social systems,
and organizations (including human service organizations
and agencies) tend toward decay, mediocrity and worse.

4
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3. The entire concept of conflict of interest has
received much clearer conceptualization in recent years.
Because the above-mentioned organizational dynamics
tend to possess organizational members to a degree
which was previously unrecognized (largely because of
the unconsciousness or counter-intuitiveness of
organizational processes), it is now widely acknowledged
that the representation by individual actors (and even
organizations) of particular interests should not be
jeopardized by the co-existence of clashing interests
within the same mandate or organization. This has
implications to which I shall return later;
Recognition and gradual admission of these and
related organizational realities has brought more
people to at least an intellectual acceptance of the
need for independent and powerful representation of
impaired citizens, and indeed of any citizens who must
deal with powerful organized societal structures. However,
it is also essential to recognize the source or sources
of the remaining opposition to the advocacy movement.
It is quite likely that most of this opposition results
from ignorance or denial of the existence and power of
various organizational dynamics, such as those listed
above.* Such opposition may come from politicians
and from human service agency people whom one would
often expect to be more sophisticated about organizational
realities than ordinary citizens. The opposition may be
embodied in the view that good clinical agency service
is advocacy; that if professionals only practiced
sound techniques, no other advocacy would be needed;
that efforts should be directed toward service
improvement rather than advocacy

* It is very difficult to relate to the powerful and
usually overriding strength of universal characteristics
of organizations without having studied the social laws
that determine much of organizational functioning, For
a relatively quick introduction and overview of this topic,
the reader is referred to Berelson and Steiner (1964),
Hage and Aiken (1970), Rothman (1974), Weick (1969),
Weissman (1973), and Wolfensberger (1973).
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and advocacy organization-building; and/or that such
advocacy structures should be dismantled once they
have cleaned up a service area that had lost its
(former?) purity and quality. Of course, such a
conceptualization--even if well-intentioned rather
than merely defensive--simply fails to incorporate
the empirical facts of human and especially organizational
behaviour. Even in human service workers who are
intimately familiar with organizational dynamics, the
reality that they are a factotum of an organization
that has all sorts of purposes and functions other
than the officially stated and nobly worded ones may
be so threatening to self-concept and self-esteem as
to elicit denial. Indeed, the prevalence of this type
of self-defensive blindness and even arrogance is,
itself, one of the overwhelmingly real, maladaptive
and yet universal dynamics of organizations.
This issue of conflict of interest is one that must
be understood and appreciated in order to come to grips
with any number of problems related to advocacy for,
and protection of, people. It is for this reason that
the topic will now be discussed even though this
discussion here postpones our addressing ourselves to
the question, "what is advocacy?".
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THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEM
One of the principles that human service workers
as well as ordinary citizens find most difficult to
relate to is that in human services, as in the larger
world, there are an unlimited number of situations
where two valid principles clash and cannot coexist.
People assume that when they are confronted with a
situation where two principles clash, then one or both
must be invalid, which is not necessarily true. Often,
people are so discombobulated by this phenomenon that
they get caught in all sorts of dilemmas and twisted
solutions. For example, the welfare of service providers
and the welfare of service consumers are rarely
identical, yet is is as valid for service providers
to have good experiences, lead constructive lives, and
have their needs met as it is for service consumers.
Similarly, it is desirable to have both cheap
energy and plentiful energy, but there is a constant
conflict between these two, and usually one is sacrificed
for the other. Self-advocacy vs. other-advocacy is
another example. In many situations, it is infinitely
more efficient to go ahead and advocate for another
person, solve that person's problem quickly and
efficiently, and settle that particular problem. On
the other hand, over the long run, it is more constructive
for the person to learn to solve his or her own problem,
but that may require prolonged or difficult guidance
and tuition in problem solving. As Simon Olshansky
(1969) has written, in human service syst~ms, decisions
are often made for clients by staff because advancing
the client to competent decision-making would be
costly and time-consuming. Built-in dilemmas such as
these do not have solutions. I mention this here
because in many advocacy-related situations, there will
be conflicting principles.

i

Conflict of interest is merely one type of conflict
between incompatible but often nevertheless valid, sound,
even moral, dynamics or forces. In advocacy and
protection, it· is one of the gravest issues. It means
that there is more than one person's or group's interest
involved in an action, that these interests are at odds
with each other, and that therefore, there exists a
tension that must be expected to be unsustainable and
that will eventually be resolved by a tipping of the
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scales into one direction or another. Unlike some tensions
that are adaptive and lead to better solutions, the tensions
of conflict of interest are rarely adaptive, and usually
lead to inferior solutions in which one interest is
sacrificed entirely or in part.
In order to concretize the role of conflict of
interest in human service-related advocacy, a number
of real-life examples will be cited. The first three
examples are borrowed from Gilhool (1976, p. 164). They
illustrate how a human service worker can be beset by
tremendous pressures to put the interests of the agency
above the interests of weak or disadvantaged people who
may be the agency's clients.

4

On January 13, 1973, at 6:30 in the morning,
Benny Parrish, a public assistance case worker in
Oakland, California, was instructed to join
"Operation Bedcheck," a search of the houses of
public assistance recipients--"especially the beds,
closets, bathrooms, and other places of
concealment," to determine if there was a man in
the house and, hence, whether assistance could be
terminated. He refused, asserting that such
searches were illegal. He was fired for insubordination
The County Civil Service Commission upheld his firing. ,
But the California Supreme Court, in an unanimous
,
opinion, held that Benny Parrish was protected in
his right to assert the rights of his clients and
ordered him reinstated.
On the evening of July 27, 1976, Ocania Chalk,
a public assistance case worker in York County,
Pennsylvania, attended a meeting of public
assistance recipients, a group called the Public
Assistance Committee. There, he criticized the
personnel and policies of the York County Assistance
Office. He urged recipients to "get on case workers'
backs and demand their rights;" he stated that some
case workers failed to accord recipients dignity
and to inform them of their rights of appeal; and,
quoting Frederick Douglass, he exhorted recipients
to "agitate, agitate, agitate." He was suspended
from his job without pay for "having caused
embarassment and unfavourable publicity to the
department." The State Civil Service Commission

8

4

upheld his suspension. But the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, generally more conservative than
California's, reversed, holding Ocania Chalk's
remarks protected by the First Amendment. "As
a member of that governmental institution (York
County Assistance Office)," the Court found, "he
had a unique, and valuable, perspective, from·
which to view it." The benefit of that perspective
could not be denied to his clients or to the public,
From 1966 through 1969, Father Joseph Donahue,
Chaplain of Manteno State Hospital in Illinois
("a gigantic institution operating on a skimpy
budget," as the court put it), engaged in a
campaign of public criticism of the institution.
He wrote in a union newspaper column; he addressed
the State Federation of Labour and made other
public speeches; he wrote letters to the governor
and to the editor of the local newspaper; and he
published a paid advertisement in that paper. He
complained, inter alia, of insufficient employees,
unqualified employees, inadequate care, and in the
paid advertisement criticized the Director of the
Mental Health Department and the Superintendent of
the Hospital. In 1969, he was fired. He sued in
federal court for reinstatement. He won and was
awarded back pay, punitive damages and attorney's
fees.
Another relevant and recurring type of conflict
of interest may be found in the field of child placement ..
Years ago (and to some degree to this day), child placement
agencies typically were mandated and funded to attend to
homeless, mostly orphaned, children, and then later to
socially abandoned or abused children. One of the mandates
of such agencies was either to find adoptive homes for
such children, or at least to find foster homes in the
meantime. Before the helping forms in our society became
highly structured, homeless children were typically "taken
in" informally, e.g., when parents died, it was very
common for relatives or neighbours to take in the children
and raise them, and nothing much was made of it. In large
households, it made little difference whether seven or
nine children were raised. It is still that way in some
cultures, and even in parts of North America, as in the
Canadian Maritime provinces.

9

Through professional and case work, the child
placement agencies tried to accomplish something
similar, except that in the case of foster children,
the foster parents would be paid; and in the case of
adoptive families, they would not be, as they would
be rearing a child as their own. A major reason some
children had to be fostered instead of adopted was that
many children that ended up homeless were not necessarily
parentless. Perhaps their parents were non-functional
but would not release their child for adoption. At
any rate, the child placement agencies typically tried
to build up a certain pool of foster families that could
provide emergency places where the agency could place
a child on short notice into a "holding pattern" while
it tried to see what else it could do for the child.
However, what often also happened was that the
child placement agencies would place a child on short
notice into an available foster home, and the foster
family would grow very attached to the child and want
to adopt him/her. That would throw the placement agency
into consternation, because if that foster family adopted
the child, the agency would lose that home as a
conveniently available future foster home. In turn, this
would mean that case workers would have to go out and
aggressively search for and develo·p new rotating foster
homes, which was a great inconvenience to others. So
they commonly would keep a child in a home only until
the foster parents began to show signs of growing
affection, and then they would jerk the child out and
place him/her into another foster family, and so on, from
one placement to another.
In one public presentation where we explained this
practice, one of the men in the audience jumped up
and started shouting, "So that's why they did that to
me." The man, apparently in his forties, had grown up
as a foster child, and had been moved from home to home
until he was of legal age. Though now working in a
human service role himself, he had never understood the
reason for his being rotated through so many homes. He
shouted from the floor, "I used to think they did that
to me because I was bad."
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Innumerable child placement agencies have perpetuated
what one can only call legalized and institutionalized
crimes against homeless children. In recent years there
have been significant broad advances into more appropriate
handling of children by child placem~nt agencies-~although
many continue the practice of careless and "musical-chair"
placement.
One can understand some of these practices much
better if one can recognize that the child placement
agencies had conflicts of interest when it came to
placement of children in foster homes. It was in an
agency's interest to maintain foster homes on an
available rotating basis, because then the staff did
not have to go out constantly and recruit new ones.
Secondly, it may actually have been in the interest
of some other child who came along la~er on, for a
specific foster home to be available for emergency
placement, illustrating that there sometimes are
conflicts between the interests of different clients:
what is good for one client may diminish the welfare
of another. Interestingly, placement agencies have
hardly ever admitted to this reality, and to this
day, they will generally deny it.
Teacher's groups have commonly been opposed to measures
which assess teacher and school performance. If it is
found that their performance as teachers is inferior, they
might lose their jobs. Whose interests are they defending?
It is in the children's interests to have the quality of
teaching assessed, but teachers see it as their interest
not to be assessed because it might mean losing one's job.
Concern with job security led to an unusual instance
of people doing the right thing for the wrong reasons.
Today, the lives of institutionalized persons are not
necessarily being improved through so-called deinstitutionalization, because they are being dumped into snakepit
foster and nursing homes, other institutions, etc. The
Federation of State and County Municipal Employees put
out a book, entitled Out of Their Beds and Into the Streets
(Santiestevan, 1975), which validly documents and
condemns this dumping--but does it for the wrong reasons.
The union sponsored the book because it wants to save
the institutions and thus provide jobs. "People have a
right to be institutionalized." Thus, the wrong people
(the union) have been doing the right thing (exposing
the problems of deinstitutionalization) to protect their
own interests.
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To illustrate the conflict of interest issue further,
it should be noted that even families of handicapped
persons may have such conflicts when they are acting on
behalf of their own handicapped member. A common
phenomenon with families who have placed a child in an
institution is that they do not wish for that person to
live at home with them later on, or when the child is
grown. Yet at the same time, they often resist making
any other kind of suitable arrangement, and may
obstruct any attempts by other persons or agencies to
place that person in a more favourable setting, because
such a move is seen as implicitly interpreting the family
as having inappropriately abandoned their relative.
This conflict of interest points out the fact that a
parent is not always the best advocate for a person.
Human service workers argue constantly that they
are idealistic, dedicated, noble, etc. and therefore
they need not and should not be under any rules concerning
conflict of interest. The delusions of human service
workers that they are true to their professional
moralities and not to their employing agencies, or that
they are not controlled by their professional groups
but by their moral commitment to their clients, are
really quite striking. In their blindness to the dynamics
that control them, human service workers have fallen
victims to a professional training that has taught them
that they are noble and dedicated human beings,
unselfish, and always ready to give for someone else.
In essence, they have been taught that a good human
service worker does not have conflicts of interest.
This is of course, not true, but is one of the many
unconscious falsehoods which are deeply embedded in the
professional socialization process of human services.
The fact is that few human service workers are
emancipated from their culture and its values, and
none from their humanity and its dynamics. They are
encaptured by human foibles and weaknesses, by their
culture, and by the structure of human service systems.
Fewer safeguards and precautions would be needed if
more workers were even able to perceive and admit the
conflicting pressures under which they work.

I
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Despite its own shortcomings, the legal profession
has a very clear understanding of these issues, and
there is much to be learned in this area from the law,
as by and large, lawyers are highly attuned to
conflicts of interest. Judges and justices in our
courts do not rule on a case in which they have an
interest. A justice will disqualify him/herself if
a case comes up in which he/she has a financial
or other interest--which is not at all uncommon.
Indeed, it is well understood in the judicial system
that one should avoid not only conflict of interest,
but even the appearance of such a conflict. Similarly,
we expect avoidance of the appearance of conflicts
of interest even when we are willing to discount
their actual presence. Charles Wilson, who was
nominated by President Eisenhower as Secretary of
Defense, held approximately $2 million worth of stock
in General Motors when he came up for congressional
approval. Before he could be confirmed, he had to
sell this stock at a vast loss, because as Secretary
of Defense, he could not afford even the appearance
of a conflict of interest with a major defense
contractor (even though he believed that "what is
good for General Motors is good for the country").
If Watergate has done nothing else, it has underlined
the fact that the suggestion of conflict of interest
can be as destructive as the actual or real conflict
itself.
Common Cause is one of the groups in the United
States that are advocating for the legal end of
conflict of interest situations in government. In
1975, the governor of New York signed an executive
order mandating full financial disclosure for every
policy-making state official. Proposed legislation
would also prohibit legislators and legislative
employees from representing clients before state
agencies, which they were able to do before. This
is one of the changes that Common Cause lobbying has
brought about.
In order to recognize conflicts of interest, it
is useful to be aware of its five major recurring
sources.
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a) What is good for the agency is not necessarily
good for the clients. It is well known from organizationa l
dynamics that organizations are like people in the way
they function. Organizations have a life of their own
where survival is paramount, anything will be done to
maintain it. People may be more ready to sacrifice
their lives than organizations are. So agency survival
interests may clash with the interests of the client.
For instance, scandals, painful revelations or budget
cuts might happen if client interests were uncompromisingly
(or even moderately compromisingly) pursued.
b) The professions of various staff members may
make all sorts of compromising demands. Indeed, the
codes of ethics of many professions contain some immoral
components. Examples are the various codes of ethics
provisions in the professions of law and pharmacy,
designed as price fixing collusions. One unjust impact
of such practices has been the prevention of the posting
of drug prices in drug stores in poverty neighbourhoods
so that poor people would be able to do comparative
shopping.
c) Being accountable to superiors who have all
sorts of motives and interests is another source of
conflict. Close-outs in vocational rehabilitation are
a classic example. A certain number of close-outs may
be required by a certain date, and as it gets close to
the deadline, counsellors may be told by their superiors
to close clients out in order to meet the required quota.
d) The interests of one client or protege may
interfere with the interests of another. It may be in
the interest of Client A to get all of the money, or
the attention, regardless of the needs of Client B or
C; it may be in the interest of the protege to receive
all the attention of an advocate. Thus, the moment a
person has more than one client, or the moment an
advocate has more than one protege, a conflict usually
exists. This potential source of conflict is rarely
recognized.
e) The fourth source of conflict may be avoided
by having only one client or protege, but the personal
interests of the human service worker or advocate
cannot be avoided, and it is almost always at odds with
those of the client or protege. It may be in the
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interest of the client for the staff member never to take
a vacation nor have time off, eat, rest, have leisure,
etc, Thus, sheer survival is a source of conflict.
In attempting to either resolve conflicts of
interest, or conflicts of competing principles that have
nothing to do with conflicts of interest, a few thoughts
and strategies are offered that have often proved useful.
First, it is very important to distinguish
theoretically between a compromise and a trade-off. A
trade-off must occur in a situation in which it is
intrinsically impossible to maximize two outcomes
simultaneously, because the two outcomes are inherently
in competition with each other. A compromise exists
when one has to choose among two or more outcomes in
which the outcomes are not intrinsically incompatible,
but are suboptimal only because of certain extrinsic
circumstances.

l,
~

An example of a compromise would be almost any
instance in which service quality is lowered merely
because of the scarcity of funds, but where there is
no reason why one might not simultaneously have high
funding and high quality, if only the funding
situation were more favourable. In contrast, a
classical example in which an optimal solution is
even theoretically impossible exists in those instances
in which the optimal location of a service to
devalued persons would be in a certain neighbourhood
(such as a downtown area) in which, for probably
valid reasons, there are already a number of other
well-placed services to devalued persons, and where
the addition of yet another such service would
saturate community tolerance and its potential for
assimilating devalued people. Obviously, not all
programs can be located in the same optimal
location. On the other hand, if the new service
located itself in another area reasonably removed
from a congregation of other services to devalued
clients, it would probably be penalized in terms
of ease of access from and to the service region
population.
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Secondly, it is important to recognize what it
is that is at issue when sacrifices are at stake.
A great deal of judgement is required in determining
the relative merit of two conflicting principles.
They may both be valid, but one may be more universal
than the other, or one may have more long-term payoff.
Often, it is necessary to trade off one good principle
for another good one. One way to make these judgements
is to acknowledge that one principle is good, but the
other one is even better; or that they are both bad, but
that one is less so.
One fundamental distinction to be made here is that
among principles, strategies, and tactics. Tactics
may be compromised very readily; strategies should only
rarely be compromised; and principles should never be
sacrificed. Interestingly, conflicts such as the ones
sketched above generally occur between strategies
rather than principles. If they occur among
principles, then one is either dealing with principles
at different levels of generality, or one is trying to
adhere to two or more self-contradictory principles
at the same time.
What the above rationales and realities imply is
that human service workers should become more
conscious of, and perhaps differentiate among: the
compromises or trade-offs which they have made;
those compromised or traded-off measures which are
simply not under their control and which cannot be
improved at a given moment; and those measures which
m~ght very well be improved either by programmatic
changes, by ideological changes, or by better funding.
While choosing one of the two horns of a compromise
or trade-off dilemma could be a relatively rational
and highly objectifiable task, human service planners
and decision-makers typically do not choose too well.
This is somewhat puzzling, but becomes more understandable
when one recalls that most human service workers are not
oriented to a systems approach, and therefore do not
automatically fall into a reflexive routine of
systematically considering, examining, and mutually
comparing all possible alternatives, costs, and
benefits. Therefore, a brief and simple guideline
for making compromises or trade-offs is offered here.
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1. While suspending judgement, all conceivable
alternative s should be listed . Typically, this
takes place optimally in a classical type of
brainstorming session in a group.
2. This list of options can be reduced by
eliminating those that are patently irrelevant,
or impossible to achieve.
3. For each remaining option, all conceivable
benefits should be listed.
4. The costs (in a broad sense) associated with
each of the options sho uld also be listed.
5. One now ranks the options in terms of the
most promising ra tios o f costs to yields.
6. Only a t this point should one adopt the
highest-ranked option that is feasible.
7. The remaining non-utilized options should
be retained "on file" in case the option that has
been adopted proves to be unfeasible, unworkable,
or unsuccessful, leaving open a fall-back on the
most promising of the remaining options.
The same procedure can be used for prioritizing
one's actions, with the relevant ratio here being
taking into account how feasible a measure is at the
moment, and how quickly it can be implemented without
jeopardizing the implementation of more important
but "slower" measures.
This section is intended to sensitize the reader
to the reality and power of conflicting interest. In
the later section on "Some Basic Assumptions Underlying
The Proposed Global Model," various implications that
are specific to advocacy and protection will be
spelled out.
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WHAT IS ADVOCACY?
One major problem in the wider dissemination, and
at least partial acceptance, of the advocacy concept
has been the tremendous confusion surrounding the
definition of the term. Today, it is possible to find
almost anything labelled advocacy, including some
highly traditional and even highly dehumanizing services.
Thus, placing a person in an institution might very well
be called "institutional advocacy"; providing a person
with very traditional case work counselling might be
called "case work advocacy" or "counselling advocacy";
s11bmitting a news release regarding a devalued group
of people to the media might be called "public advocacy";
etc. In fact, this bandwagon phenomenon has almost
the effect of perverting and undermining a genuine
advocacy approach, and I personally have called it
"Kraft cheese advocacy", in analogy to the Kraft
cheese commercials that in essence propose that one
should take any kind of food and add cheese to it.
Today, people would like to continue doing what they
have always done, but add the word advocacy to it.
In order to shed light on this confused scene,
it is necessary to first clearly differentiate
between advocacy and non-advocacy, and to secondly
define various, and strikingly different, types of
advocacy.
All definitions are arbitrary. All one can do
is offer for wider adoption a definition that has
clarity and utility. The current affixation of the
advocacy label to just about anything obviously loses
both of the desirable attributes of any definition:
clarity, and utility; other definitions might possess
one but not both of these two desirable criteria.
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It is useful to start with the culturally
normative meaning of the noun or verb "advocate."
As most people know, it comes from the Latin, and means
to speak to a matter or issue. In time, it has come to
mean speaking on the behalf of a person or issue; and
where a person is involved, it almost invariably has
come to mean speaking on the behalf of another person,
rather than oneself. Of course, we often speak of
self-advocacy, and that concept is certainly a
legitimate one to which we shall return, especially
when discussing the balance between the need for
self-advocacy and other-advocacy. However, of
necessity, we must focus primarily on advocacy on the
behalf of others. Even when individuals band together
in order to advocate on their own behalf, this type
of advocacy becomes as much advocacy on behalf of an
issue as on behalf of any one specific individual-indeed, to the degree that each member of a selfadvocating group really advocates on behalf of an
issue that benefits other members of his/her own
group, and perhaps benefits them even more than
oneself, this form of self-advocacy may actually
be more other-advocacy than self-advocacy.
Further, merely speaking on behalf of a person
or group does not seem to be enough. After all, in
the narrow and non-vigorous sense of the word "advocacy, "
almost anyone can lay claim to being an advocate for
all sorts of causes and other people. If somebody
punches me in the nose and I shout "You shouldn't do
things like that to other people," does that make me
an advocate? Is it advocacy for the greater weal if
I draw the attention of the welfare director to the
fact that his office mistakenly mailed out a duplicate
check to the same poor family? Is it not true that
in a technical sense, perhaps every human service
worker, every human service agency, every public official,
every church, etc., could claim to be advocating?
Obviously, much more is needed if the concept of
advocacy is to hold the special meaning it is intended
to convey.
I propose that this "much more" consists of three
components. The first one is vigor and vehemence.
Speaking for someone in inaudible whispers is
conscience-salving at worst and praye~ et best. Advocacy
implies fervor and depth of feeling in advancing a cause,
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or the interest of another person; it calls for doing
more than what is done routinely, and what would be
found rountinely acceptable; in this sense, the
advocate acts at least as vigorously for another person
or group as for him/herself.
Secondly, I propose that even fervent advocacy is
cheap advocacy if it costs nothing more significant
than a shout here, a little excitement there, or a bit
of traditional consideration and thoughtfulness. I
propose that the essence of advocacy implies a distinct
cost to the advocate. This distinct cost may involve
any number of things: time that one would much rather
have spent on something else; wear and tear on one's
emotions, such as one would ordinarily avoid; investment
of one's material substance and possessions; sacrifice
of rest, sleep and/or recreation; etc. Indeed, the
cost may involve one of the highest prices of advocacy,
and that is risk, such as the risk of incurring
resentment and hostility from others, of being ~aunted,
or becoming an object of ridicule, of being considered
foolish or crazy, of being rejected by one's peers and
colleagues, of being in danger of loss of job; the
risk may involve that of being hurt in violence, of loss
of health--perhaps even loss of life itself. Indeed,
without significant cost, an action should not be viewed
as advocacy, or no more than Kraft cheese advocacy,
even if it is otherwise valuable action, such as
described in the next section. In fact, it is fervor
and cost that may distinguish all sorts of protection
from advocacy, in that protection may often be viewed
as being, advocacy from which the cost has been
removed--a burnt-out star that may have a lot of weight
but no more fire.
Thirdly, as seen from the preceding discussion of
conflict of interest, whenever advocacy is intended to
be defined as constituting a social institution (in the
form of advocacy agencies, citizen advocacy, ombudsmanship,
etc.), it must also be structured so as to be maximally
free from conflict of interest. If it is not so
structured, then the social institution that is being
established sould be defined as not an advocacy institution,
but as some other service quality safeguard, such as
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discussed below. This is not to say that an individual
worker in a non-advocacy type of social institution
(e.g., agency) could not function as an advocate on
some occasions by taking on a cause in a vigorous
fashion and at significant personal cost, but the
institution itself is not to be viewed as an advocacy
institution. In fact, the advocacy action of one of
its members constitutes an example. of an individual
rising up against the strong anti-advocacy dynamics
that have been imposed on and by his/her organization,
thus constituting an exception to the prevailing
forces and probabilities.
So as to further sharpen
is, we will now also review a
may be mistaken for, confused
Some of these may actually be
conditions, as when they meet

our image of what advocacy
number of activities that
with, or called advocacy.
advocacy under certain
the above criteria.
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WHAT ADVOCACY IS NOT
Not All Change Agentry is Advocacy
In addition to emphasizing the other-directedness
of much of tfle advocacy concept, I also propose that a
major distinction must be made between those activities
which are of a general change agentry nature, and those
change agentry activities which indeed constitute advocacy.
Too often, people equate all change-oriented activities
with being advocacy; I do not. I can conceive of
various types of developmental efforts, community
organization, planning, training, and other change
strategies that are most certainly strategies or tactics
within the process of change, and that are designed to
achieve a certain type of change objective, but that I
do not view as constituting advocacy. For instance, a
state/provincial department of human resources drawing
up a plan to provide services for a particular group of
persons in need does not necessarily constitute advocacy;
in fact, the plan may actually embody just the opposite,
in consciously or unconsciously regulating a group of
people (such as the poor), in segregating and containing
them (such as the mentally retarded), or in depriving
them of privileges so as to transfer these privileges to
other groups (as in the case of the elderly).
Most Desirable and Sound Service System
Quality Safeguards Are Not Advocacy
There are numerous sound principles of service
development, service operation, evaluation, organizational
arrangements, etc., that should be adopted, and that would
contribute significantly to service quality. Probably
the bulk of these principles are not adopted--indeed,
they are often not even studied or known; or if studied,
they tend to be rejected or avoided. However, the point
here is that most of these adaptive processes and
structures are not of an advocacy nature, although it
may take advocacy to attain their implementation. The
nature of these safeguards will be discussed once more
later in the paper.

22

However, it might be fit to mention here that
"protection" (as in the concept of "advocacy and
protection") is often not advocacy, even if it does
protect. Both advocacy and protection are needed;
sometimes they are the same; often they are not the
same; and therefore, they certainly are not to be
viewed as synonymous. Sometimes, that which is
advanced as being protection could actually be termed
to be "anti-advocacy" in nature. Even such an antiadvocacy act as putting someone into prison may be
defined as "protection", as in "protective custody."
In fact, in traditional protective services and protective
service legislation, the concept of "protection" has
typically been saturated with overtones of physical
custody of the person, typically in an institutional
or quasi-institutional setting. The fact that this
tradition has not died out is dramatically underlined
by the 1977 Arkansas Adult Protective Services Act.
It covers three forms of protective custody, and
carries a strong flavour of being much more concerned
with physical movement of a person from present abode
to an agency type of abode, than with the types of
social advocacy and protection that would be more
likely to be carried out under the citizen advocacy
schema. In other words, major concern seems to be
placed upon removing a person from the environment
in which abuse has occurred, rather than preventing
abuse from occurring, or reversing it within that
person's environment.
Not Everything Good Is Advocacy
Some people h ave become so enchanted with the
word advocacy that they bestow it on anything they
think is positive or benevolent. When a fraternity
runs a fund-raising marathon, they may ca ll it
advocacy; when a teacher teaches a child to read,
that may be called advocacy; when a passer-by drops
a dime into the Salvation Army kettle, he/she may
consider that advocacy. Even ordinary professional
services (supervisin g a workshop, giving counselling)
may be called advocacy.
Obviously, all this is Kraft cheese advocacy.
Good intentions alone, nor even desirable actions, are
not necessarily advocacy, as we shall see.
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Case Work Can Rarely Be Advocacy
Some people, and particularly so c ial workers,
rehabilitation counsellors, and similar personnel,
seem particularly tempted to claim that case work-like
professional services are, and perhaps a lwa ys have
been, advocacy, and that the more recent advocacy
movement is really an unnecessary duplication of longstanding efforts which, at most, need a little cleaning
up in consciousness or efficiency.
In my own experience of all types of human service
agencies, residential institutions have been the most
resistive to advocacy; and among human service
professions, social work and medicine (including
psychiatry) have been the most resistive. Perhaps
the resistance from many professionals can be
understood as a derivative of the above view of
case work-type services already being advocacy. Later
on, we will explain further why most such services
are not and cannot be, and often should not be,
advocacy.
Everything that has been said so far, and that will
be said below, does not deny that a staff member of a
service agency might not be an advocate . However, in
order to be an advocate, such a worker would usually
have to act outside the scope of his/her agency and
work role, and/or reject rather than implement its
society-mandated policies--with all the risks
pertaining to that. Of course, that is the point:
no 'cost, such as risk, no advocacy.
In-House "Advocacy" ls Not Advocacy
In recognition of some of the dynamics briefly
discussed in the historical review, many agencies or
even service systems have established certain internal
safeguards designed to protect the individuality of a
consumer, to prevent a client from "getting lost" in
the system, or to give consumers an easier internal
route for voicing a grievance . Many of these safeguards may be called "ombudsmanship", although they
are not at all what is understood to be the
Scandinavian social-legal institution of the
Ombudsman, as explained later.

24

-

The first type consists of an office with paid
staff functioning as a sort of "inspector-general" to
a whole service system. An example may be a nursing
home Ombudsman for a whole state/province, functioning
in the executive branch of government, usually the
state/provincial office on aging or equivalent.

The second type typically involves a single
staff member (or a few members) within a specific
a gency (e . g., within a single nursing home, or
rehabilitation office), who is available to clients
in order to check out grievances, bring problems to
the director's attention, etc . This type of
ombudsmanship is even less independent than the
first one.
The thi rd t ype involves the designation of
different staff members within a specific agency as
having a special responsibility for facilitating a
specific client's progress through the agency. For
instance, an attendant in an institution, a
psychologist in a workshop, etc., may be charged with
an extra-special concern with one or a few clients.
Positions of this type are often called client advocate,
patient advocate, counsellor advocate, staff advocate,
in- house ombudsman, etc.
Desirable as all of the above functions are, they
are really clinical service provider, regulator, or
funder functions, at best a step or two displaced
from the service provider to the service regulator
or funder. As such, they are not free from conflict
of interest, and are therefore not real advocacy,
underlining once more that not everything that is
good and desirable is advocacy. Indeed, such in-house
functions may operate under such poor ideology, or under
such tremendous agency and agency system pressures, that
they are totally non-functional, or merely enhance the
image of the service system. Advocacy may be
restricted to handing out "These Are Your Rights"
booklets, or may even assume the role of "cooling off"
criticism and defending the service provider. The mere
fact that genuine advocacy may take place in some such
arrangements at some point in time does not mean that
the function itself is set up to be advocacy as it
ought to be conceptualized and structured.
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VARIOUS PAST APPROACHES TO PROTECTION AND
GUARDIANSHIP,AND THEIR PROBLEMS
Until relatively recently, much of what we now
would subsume under advocacy was either 1) done
informally and sporadically, 2) done by voluntary
citizen action groups, mostly on a collective basis
for the benefit of collectivities rather than
individuals, or 3) subsumed under the concept of
"protective service." While the first two ideas
are fairly clear and well-recognized, the third one
is not, and a brief analysis here is in order.
The Background of Protective Services

I
1,
,,1"
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The advocacy concept has a number of ideological
and historical roots. Certainly one of the most
prominent of these must be the protective services
concept which has led a not very prominent but
nevertheless clearly identifiable existence in the
human services context for quite some time. The
basic idea that some people are so impaired as to
need various forms of protection is as old as
recorded history. Elizabeth Boggs (1966) pointed
out that protective services for those who are
not fully able to look after themselves or their
affairs have their origins in the principle of
"parens patriae." Ever since the Middle Ages,
persons who have been deemed incompetent, as well
as children, have been entitled to this special
protection of the king and his successors in government.
Unfortunately, not much progress has been made in the
implementation of this principle in the past millennium.
Indeed, with the rise of the principle of individual
rights and its resultant limitations on the authority
of government to intervene in personal and family
affairs, the proper implementation of the principle
of "parens patriae" in the case of those who need it
has been impeded rather than fostered.
In the United States (and I suspect in Canada as
well), until just about a hundred years ago, little
attention was paid to the principle even as it affected
children. In 1875, a case of child abuse so offended
moral sensibilities that some child protective services
were begun. At about this time , some meager beginnings
had also been made in protecting the retarded. mostly
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by way of institutionalization . However, this philosophy
of care quickly changed to one emphasizing the protection
of society from retarded and other devalued individuals,
and we have not yet fully emerged from this period. It
is only within the past fifteen or so years that some
attention has been focussed on the need for protective
services for the aged.
A useful operational definition is: protective
services are those services and activities which are
undertaken by the paid staff of an agency1<on behalf of
other individuals who are not fully able to act for
themselves. These protective services or activities
are directed toward the individual's well-being, are
backed up by legal sanctions, and are carried out by
primarily social service techniques. A non-techni.cal
way of thinking about a protective service is the
provision of the kind of affectionate yet realistic
on-going management and care that a good parent would
exercise over a son or daughter.
The Problems and the Desiderata of
A Personal Protection Schema
It is remarkable that when one reviews the various
formal schemas designed to protect the interests of
impaired individuals (as distinct from classes of
people) around the world, they all seem to fit, at
least approximately, into one of six categories,
yielding nine variations.

A.

Guardianship of the person
1. Individualized
2. Collectivized (usually public)

B.

Guardianship of estate (property, income, etc.)
1. Individualized
2. Collectivized (usually public)

C.

Trusts
1. Major insurance types
2. Trivial, and usually collectivized, types

* As discussed later, a protective service should
be independent, and free from conflict of interest,
but they are typically not so structured at present.
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D.

Case work-type protective agency services

E.

Informal relationship-based supports

F.

Combinations of some of the above

Furthermore, there are also thirteen distinct
types of problems or outright shortcomings that recur
over and over, although different protective schemas
may be bedevilled by different combinations of these
problems:
A.
B.

Stigmatizing incompetency procedures
Built-in conflicts of interest
Paid staff
2. The protective advocacy agency may provide
other direct services

'

1.

C.

Impersonality of relationships
1. One worker for many clients
2. Discontinuity of personal relationships
3. High likelihood of neglect of the
expressive needs of impaired people
4. Cumbersome bureaucracy

D.

Poor flexibility
1. Only one or a few types of relationship
roles available
2. High likelihood of orientation to
instrumental and crisis needs

E.

High potential of overprotection and overutilization, because of the administrative
convenience of many schemas

F.

Danger of abuse, e.g.,
1. For social control
2. To institutionalize impaired persons
3. To ease parental anxiety, i.e., as
"insurance" against future parental
incapacity

G.

A tendency to rely on a single approach,
even though no single schema is sufficient

When I was unable to identify a single schema
that was a) adequately comprehensive, b) satisfying
in conceptualization and ideology, and c) actually
adaptively operational somewhere, I tried to identify
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the characteristics of an ideal schema, and it
appeared that such a schema would have eleven
characteristics:
1.

Separation from case work and other direct
services

2.

Individualization of provisions

3.

Potential for long-term continuity of
personal relationships

4.

Instrumental, expressive, and combined
support options

5.

Both formal and informal relationship
options

6.

Forms that are highly flexible, and easily
changeable over time

7.

A built-in ideological orientation and
commitment to the advocacy function

8.

Consistency with cultural values

9.

Maximally feasible freedom from conflict
of interest

10.

Practical and feasible in implementation

11.

Available as needed

It is out of these considerations, though
initially not as systematized as I am presenting
here, that starting in 1966 I evolved the citizen
advocacy schema, which now needs to be reviewed
in preparation for the presentation of a global
multi-component model.
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A CITIZEN ADVOCACY OVERVIEW
The Components of Citizen Advocacy
Citizen advocacy (CA) was evolved in order to
maximize as many of the above factors as possible.
So citizen advocacy was defined as follows: an
unpaid competent citizen volunteer, with the support of
an independent citizen advocacy agency, represeRts-as if they were his/her own--the interests of one or
two impaired persons by means of one or several of
many advocacy roles, some of which may last for life.
In order to make this definition more intelligible,
the schema can be conceptualized as having five
cornerstones, as depicted in TabLe 1.
Table 1
The Five Cornerstones of the Citizen Advocacy Schema

Advocacy
Concept

FIVE CORNERSTONES

"'

ImplementiveAdministrative
Mechanisms

OF THE

InstrumentalExpressive Task
Distinction

CITIZEN ADVOCACY
ide Range
of Legal
Provisions
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SCHEMA

Differentiation
of Advocacy
Role Subtypes ,

The top cornerstone refers to the one-to-one
lationship by which a competent citizen volunteer,
;eee from built-in conflicts of interest, advances
~e welfare and interests of an impaired or limited
;erson, as if that person's interests were the
advocate's own. For ~a: k of a better term, _I have
applied the word protege to the person who is
presumed to be in need of significant unmet instrumental
(practical problem-solving) or expressive (affective
relationship) supports. The advocate is expected to
use primarily culturally normative means that typically'
are accessible to citizens generally, and that might
in fact be widely practiced.
The second cornerstone makes a critically
important distinction between two major types
of tasks, instrumental (problem-solving) and expressive
(emotional-affective), a s explained in Table 2. The
distinction between these tasks helps to structure
relationships so as to provide only the minimally
necessary type of supports, and to avoid both excessive
as well as inadequate protection, both of which have
so often been the hallmark of other gua rdianship/
protective-type schema s--particularly in public
guardianship. The principle of minimal protection is
implied in the theory of normalization (Wolfensber ger,
1972) and its corollary demand for en co uraging
maximal independence on the part of an impaired person.
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Table 2
The Distinction between Instrumental and Expressive Tasks

Solving practical and
material problems
"Instrumental"

tasks

Meeting needs for
communication, relationship,
warmth, love & support
"Expressive" tasks

Advise and assist with dayto-day problems: decisionmaking, transportation,
shopping, etc.

Provide emotional support
during stress and crisis

Administer property and
income

Maintain sympathetic
communication and
interaction

Represent interests
vis-a-vis agencies
and the law

Bring friendship and
fellowship to lonely
and abandoned

Insure inclusion in
appropriate services:
training, work, education,
etc.

Share emotionally
significant activities,
trips, and events
Exchange meaningful tokens
(mail, gifts, visits, or
meals) on special
occasions: birthdays,
Christmas, Hanukkah,
Valentine's Day,
Thanksgiving

Meeting relationship needs while also working out practical
problems
"Instrumental-expressive" tasks
Assume full or partial parental roles for dependent persons
Share living quarters with a (young) adult
Practical friendship to limited or disadvantaged persons
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Perhaps the most perfect type of advocacy occurs
~hen a citizen chooses to rear as his/her own, and
perhaps adopt, a handicapped and neglected child.
While few citizens can play such an ideal role, there
are many other roles--in relation to adults as well as
children--that are less demanding and yet much needed.
Among these are the provision of transportation,
counsel, or other services for the handicapped child
of a family who love and accept the child, but lack the
means to solve the child's problems.* An advocate can
make certain that the child gets the education and
training which the community has a responsibility to
provide. Advocates can sponsor institutionalized
children without (adequate) family ties by visiting
them, giving them gifts, or taking them on trips or
to entertainments and even assuming guardianship or
at least trying to protect their welfare and rights.
Handicapped adults can be assisted in such practical
matters as managing money, finding and maintaining
living quarters, securing jobs, learning how to use
transportation services, and how to vote. Citizen
advocates can give friendship and emotional support by
offering companionship, and by sharing worship or the
observance of holidays and special occasions.
A person who is returning from the institution
to live in a community group home or apartment needs
a wide range of social experiences in the community.
A special relationship is desirable for practically
all such persons, since group home or other agency
personnel must spread their relationships across so
many individuals. An advocate for a young handicapped
adult can contribute much to the successful
adjustment or readjustment of his/her protege, keeping
him/her out of trouble, teaching him/her how to use
free time well, and offering advice and support in time

* Such actions should not be offered or viewed
as a substitute for services that are or should be the
responsibility of service agencies, but as either
temporary stopgaps, or enrichments. Advocates must
resist the temptation to become long-term providers
of free services that should be rightfully available,
and/or to have their efforts diverted from obtaining
for their protege the services that others should provide.
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of stress and crisis. Young handicapped adults and
advocates of the same age can share apartments, with
the advocate providing the skills and fellowship that
make more independent apartment living possible for the
handicapped roommate.
Many parents of impaired children are quite willing
and capable of looking after the interests of their
child, but have great fears and misgivings about their
child's future once their health declines or they pass
away. Citizen advocacy can be the means of providing
parental successors who would continue to give
compassionate, individualized attention to the impaired
person, and who would try to preserve the general type
and quality of life that the child enjoyed when his/her
parents looked after his/her interests.
Advocates are especially needed as "watchdogs" of
agencies that serve their proteges, preventing such
agencies from "passing the buck," and keeping them
relevant, change-oriented, and honest. Particularly
in large cities or in large agencies, an individual
client may soon lose his/her identity, or may actually
be forgotten.
The various advocacy tasks need to be carried out
via a wide variety of advocate roles, as indicated by
the third cornerstone and Table 3. Some of these roles
are informal, and it is neither necessary nor
desirable that they be recognized by law. Other roles
and related aspects do require legal recognition, and
this brings us to the fourth cornerstone. While the
initiation of citizen advocacy would not require
legislation in most countries, the schema could be
greatly facilitated if the widest possible range of
legal options and supports were available . These
include carefully designed guardianship proceedings
safeguards; periodic and meaningful review of existing
guardianships; a wide range of options for limited
guardianships of either the person, the person's
property, or a combination thereof; various parental
and guardianship successorship options; clearer
provisions for guardianship ad litem; and subsidies
for the adoption of handicapped children.
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Table 3
Examples of the Variety of Citizen Advocacy Roles

Expressive

Instrumental

(Legal) Conservator
Instrumental Guardian
(i.e., a form of limited
Guardianship)

Informal Advocate-Friend

Informal Instrumental
Guide-Advocate

Both Instrumental & Expressive

Adoptive Parent
(Formal)

Parental or Guardianship Successor

(Formal)

Instrumental-·Expressive Guardian

(Informal)

Instrumental-Expressive Guide-·Advocate
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There is an inescapable conflict between too
much and too little advocacy. In citizen advocacy, the
ideal is "minimal advocacy" (just as much help as is
needed but no more), in contrast to other services
which usually emphasize that more is better. Traditionally,
handicapped people have never had enough advocacy, and
yet there are people who carry the idea of minimal
advocacy to the point where they may deny legal guardianship
to people who need it. But if a person is impaired in
competency, there must be someone who will make wise
and kind decisions for that person, if need be throughout
his/her life.
Contrary to much misinterpretation, citizen advocacy
was never designed to exclude guardianship. Quite the
opposite is true. The need for formal guardianship, or
some version thereof, was one of the reasons for the
original conceptualization of the citizen advocacy
schema. An advocate can be a guardian or a conservator,
and not cease being an advocate. Not understanding this,
people sometimes speak in terms of a program being either
citizen advocacy or guardianship; the correct phrasing
would distinguish between advocates in informal roles in
comparison to advocates in formal (i.e., legal) roles.
Citizen advocacy offices are therefore expected to
consciously and non-apologetically recruit guardians.
It is also incorrect to assume that those citizen
advocates who hold a formal role such as guardianship
or conservatorship are somehow unaccountable, therefore
apt to misuse their office, and therefore dangerous.
Quite to the contrary: a citizen advocate in a formal
role is not only in every way as accountable to the
courts as is any guardian or conservator, but is
doubly monitored, as well as supported, by additionally
having the citizen advocacy office look over his/her
shoulders, offer guidance and referral, etc. Moreover,
it is hoped that some of the other safeguards that are
desirable in a balanced schema, and that are discussed
in this monograph, would also be operational, and would
constitute yet additional back-ups, lines of defenses,
and mutual monitoring.
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The fifth and final cornerstone is a practical
implementive administrative mechanism which brings the
schema to life on a day-to-day basis. While the efforts
of citizen volunteers are noble and desirable, they
are not sufficient to sustain a balanced, successful,
major and systematic service form unless coordinated
and backed-up by staffed local or regional advocacy
offices. Such an advocacy office or staff would not
carry out advocacy functions directly, but instead
would attract, select, orient, guide, and reinforce
volunteer citizen advocates, and match them with
protlges on the basis of criteria such as commitment
to the advocacy concept, willingness to undergo
orientation and preparation for advocacy tasks,
competence in the chosen advocacy area, good character,
likely continuity and stability in the community and
in a relationship, and possibly, willingness to join
a relevant community citizen's action group. The office
would assess the needs of a person for advocacy, as well
as the ability of a citizen volunteer to contribute
through advocacy. It would train advocates, emphasizing
commitment to the advocacy concept, understanding of
the impaired person and the services of potential use
to him/her, and many other areas of action. Finally,
advocacy offices would provide emotional and
practical assistance, support, and back-up to advocates,
and mediate legal and professional services that may
be needed by the advocate and his/her protege. While
all the advocates must be unpaid volunteers, it is
of critical importance to the success of the schema
that the advocacy office have at least one paid staff
member who would be available at any time. Without
the functions of this office, and without proper
matching, citizen advocacy would be equivalent to
"ordinary spontaneous everyday moral behaviour," but
relationships would be less likely to last for long
periods. would not reach the numbers of persons that
can be reached, and would not make the service of
advocates as effective as it might be.
Since an advocate must sometimes represent the
interests of his/her protege vis-a-vis a servicerendering agency, an advocacy office ideally should be
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independently financed and affiliated. Except for
initial funding purposes, an advocacy office should
never be under the aegis of an agency whose clients
might become prot~ges. Among the desirable alternatives
is for voluntary citizen action groups (associations in
the field of mental retardation, aging, cerebral
palsy, mental health, etc.) to hand over their direct
services (if any) to public or quasi-public agencies
and to operate advocacy offices instead. Many avenues
for funding of such offices suggest themselves.
(See Wolfensberger, 1973, for an extensive analysis
of change and advocacy rather than service provision
roles of voluntary associations.)
While most advocacy relationships will be informal
and have no special status or standing in law, as a
volunteer activity, citizen advocacy is profoundly
different from programs which employ (i.e., hire)
people to be advocates, either exclusively (for
example, ombudsmen, full-time staff advocates), or
as part of their function within an agency. Equally
profound is the difference from traditional forms of
volunteer activities where individuals perform
unpaid work for~ service agency . Whatever the citizen
advocate's role or legal status, in each case, he/she
is an independent citizen volunteer whose primary
loyalty is to his/her protege, not to an agency. All
direct relationships are carried on a voluntary basis,
leaving only initiation, coordination, and supportive
functions to be performed by a relatively small paid
office staff.
Many aspects of citizen advocacy have been elaborated
in both theory and practice, and are discussed in more
detail in Wolfensberger (1975) and Wolfensberger and
Zauha (1973). For instance, a number of crisis versions
of citizen advocacy have been established, as well
as two-to-one and one-to-two relationships (dispersed
and multiple advocacy respectively). Also, the
advocate associate role has been defined as one which
provides support to an advocate or advocacy office
withou~ actually being part of a one-to-one relationship;
many agency professionals would fall into this
category . A particularly promising version of citizen
advocacy is youth advocacy, especially where the impaired
person is also a youth or a child.
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Strengths and Limitations of Citizen Advocacy
Citizen advocacy has the following eight
advantages or strengths:
1. It combines the strengths of several other
systems while avoiding some of their shortcomings.
2. 'Reasonable probabilities for continuity
and practicality of protection and advocacy exist,
due to the back-up of volunteer advocates by paid
staff.
3. Conflicts of interest are probably as low
as any schema can make them.
4. There is a highly individualized range of
advocacy options.
5. Most types of needs can be met via informal
relationships.
6. There is a reasonable likelihood that where
needed, long-term relationships will exist, whether
formal or informal.
7. The cost is relatively low, especially if
compared to some other schemas.
8. It has proven success, with almost 200
operational citizen advocacy offices across North
Anerica by early 1977.
Like any human endeavor, citizen advocacy also
has its shortcomings and built-in limitations. Some
are inherent, some are circumstantial. Inherently,
1) citizen advocacy cannot replace all other forms
of advocacy/protection; 2) it will probably never
be able to meet all of the demand, due to the limited
supply of volunteers; and 3) it does not and should
not have more than culturally typical social control
over the established relationships. Circumstantially,
1) it is very difficult to persuade implementors to
preserve and pursue sound ideological as well as
practical principles; 2) there is a tendency to
over-emphasize informal, reciprocal, and expressive
or instrumental-expressive relationships; 3) it
is difficult to get funding that is not tainted with
conflicts of interest, and 4) sometimes, opposition
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to citizen advocacy increases as it becomes more
successful and effective. Particularly in regard
to No. 2, much can be learned from the
experience of the nearly 200 citizen advocacy
offices to date. There has been a tendency to
assign advocates to the more "interesting," more
verbal, more affectional and lovable people in need.
In consequence, the pool of potential advocates was
often drained of advocates who might have taken on
the interests of those persons who may have needed
advocacy the most: those who are noncommunicative,
profoundly impaired, unattractive for some reason,
institutionalized, totally abandoned, etc. This
issue has been confronted in more recent workshops
and discussions in the citizen advocacy movement,
and more intensive coverage is more relevant to
citizen advocacy personnel and committee workers
than to the probably more broadly-oriented reader
of this paper.
Agency response to citizen advocacy can take
a wide range of forms, from one extreme of
rejection and hostility, to the other extreme of
not only support but even maladaptive idealization.
In the latter instance, citizen advocacy may be
seen as a panacea solution to all the problems of
all individuals and all services, and even as a
dumping ground onto which are dumped all the clients
with whom the agencies cannot cope and with whom
they do not know what to do.
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A GLOBAL MULTI-COMPONENT SCHEMA OF ADVOCACY/PROTECTION
IN RELATION TO A HUMAN SERVICE SYSTEM
In synthesis of all of the foregoing considerations, a
global schema is sketched herewith that attempts to 1) put
advocacy in its proper relationship to the delivery of
human (primarily clinical) services, and to service-related
change agentry, and that 2) contains several major types of
advocacy, clarified in relation to each other and to the
services system. However, prior to sketching this schema,
it is helpful to 1) state some basic assumptions in addition
to those already reviewed above under what advocacy is and
is not, and 2) offer a taxonomy of different types of advocacy.
Some Basic Assumptions Underlying the Proposed Global Model
Some of the basic assumptions underlying the global balanced multi-component advocacy/protection schema are as
follows.
1. There is rarely a need to conduct demographic surveys,
needs assessments, and similar data collections in order to
adaptively plan and initiate an advocacy/protection schema.
The needs are crying to high heaven. They are obvious to
any informed person of good will on the scene. A handful of
informed activists can provide more meaningful information
on needs in a few minutes than can costly, time-consuming
formalistic surveys which often play only the function of
delay and diversion.
There are only two valid functions for needs-type
surveys: to legitimize the efforts in the eyes of powerful
people who have invincible faith in the need of surveys and
data; and for the sake of refining an advocacy/protection
schema that has been functional for some time, and that has
met some of the more obvious and blatant needs. In the
former case, cheaply-collected "junk data" should be provided, since genuinely valid data surveys typically take
years to collect, must involve huge population bases, and
would cost up to millions of dollars. In the latter case,
data collection should be built into the provision of
advocacy/protection, and be an integral on-going part of
operations.
2.

The power of the law or the courts to solve patterns of
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social problems or abuse is extremely limited. A misconception seems to be currently sweeping the U.S. at
least that solutions to human service problems lie in the
law. More and more laws are being passed, they are becoming longer and more complex, and in many instances,
less enforceable and less respected. In a society where
almost all social "glues" (i.e., stabilizing social institutions) are corning apart, people are turning to litigation to resolve problems which are not resolvable because the social preconditions do not exist. The only
significant legal solution that seems to have emerged
from the recent human service litigation craze, and that
seems to be working to any degree in human services today
(and even that only minimally), is some of the right-toeducation rulings, The underlying problem with seeking
legislative, litigative, or related judicial solutions is
that what the culture does not have, or is unwilling to
give, cannot be won by law or in a court of law. By and
large, the law does what the culture wants it to do, and a
lot of things we are asking from the law in the courts are
things society cannot, and does not want to give.* In
consequence, a legal advocacy/protection approach is insufficient, and should be vj_ewed more as an adjunct to a
social solution rather than the other way around.
The above has many implications to the strategies
and priorities of advocacy/protection development, many
of these touched on later in this paper. For instance,
one must carefully distinguish between lawsuits that can
be won versus those that cannot; between those that can
be won, but at too high a price; and between those that
will probably lose but are worth pursuing. Among the
latter might be legal actions that attempt no more than
to make a prophetic statement, such as trying to prevent
the legalized destruction of handicapped people. My
general recommendation is to use litigation minimally and
extremely sparingly.

'''1)

ii

*Fora lengthier exposition on the "Limits of the
Law," the reader is referred to an audio cassette recordj_ng of the author's presentation before the Canadian
Association for the Mentally Retarded annual convention
in Ottawa, 1976. Available from the National Institute
on Mental Retardation, 4700 Keele St,, Downsvj_ew, Ontario,
M3J 1P3, Canada
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3. There is such a thing as conflict of interest,
it is universal, it is even more vexing in advocacy/
protection than in other services, it cannot be fully
eliminated, but it must be reduced to the minimum.
There must be separation of advocacy/protection from
service delivery, separation of some safeguards from
each other, and additional problems discussed above
and below must be addressed aggressively rather than
denied and circumvented.
Some people have difficulty understanding the
relevance of the conflict of interest issues, as
discussed at the beginning of this essay, to
advocacy and protection, namely, that when one enters
any kind of direct service (case work, rehabilitation
counselling, etc.), one should not be one's client's
guardian or guardian equivalent (e.g., as "parent
surrogate"). It used to be, for example, that
institution superintendents were guardians for
residents--sometimes for thousands of residents.
However, the interests of the agency and the worker
may not be the interests of the client. Therefore,
a client's guardian should be a person who is not
caught in this web; and who not only is not
caught, but is not likely to be caught. Indeed,
there should not even be the temptation of being
caught in dual roles. Yet in California and elsewhere,
regional centers have been established where the
caseworkers have been appointed as guardians of the
people whom they serve in a casework capacity.
Willowbrook used to be the largest institution
in the world for the mentally retarded. In 1970,
120 residents died there--an extraordinary number in
one year--8 of them choking to death on their own
vomit. Two staff members urged the parents of the
children to campaign for better conditions at the
institution; the two were fired. While this was
going on, the superintendent of Willowbrook, who
was one of only ten members of the Accreditation
Council for Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(of the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Hospitals),
was the legal guardian of many residents in the
institution. Many people have known and stated for
years that a superintendent should never be the
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guardian of his/her institutional residents, yet
that used to be the standard operating procedure.
If someone administers a large institution and at
the same time tries to be a guardian of the people
who live there, obviously there will be conflicts
of interest. A person's interest cannot be represented by the same person who needs to be advocated
against. How can the interests of a person who was
choked to death be represented by the person who has
done, supervised, or administered the choking?

'1,~11

One reason why so much clinical and agency
service should not be advocacy is simply this:
society, as well as individual citizens or agency
clients, needs its own representatives to execute
its duly selected policies. That which is in
the interest of a citizen may not be in the interest
of society, and a society which failed to constitute
proper bodies to execute and protect its larger
policies would be an unfit society . Thus, while
citizens and clients need advocates to represent
them as individuals, so society needs organizations,
agencies, and even advocates to represent its
interests, or at least to carry out its policies
even if these are not necessarily optimal. Even
non-optimal societal policies may be legitimate-much as any administrator must be given allowance
for making legitimate mistakes.
Since there is every reason to posit that the
interests of an individual and the interests of
society are not always identical or even compatible,
a balanced advocacy/protection schema needs to
include independent and forceful representation of
the interests of the individual, as well as those
of society. Also, there needs to be greater clarity
and honesty as to whose interests are being
represented by different helping or advocacy forms,
and an elimination of those conflicts of interest
that do not have to exist.
Not only is personal advocacy incompatible with
the delivery of direct clinical services to a person,
but the incompatibility extends even to systemic
advocacy, and to systemic development in general. It
is well know that if a program is set up that
attempts to serve both clinical and systemic ends,
clinical services will almost inevitably drive out
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systems development. It would be a giant leap forward
if that fact were more widely acknowledged. If it
were, no voluntary association for the retarded
would be delivering direct clinical-professional
services any more. But they do not recognize the
universal dynamic that, the moment they deliver a
clinical service, there is a conflict of interest
with the advocacy function, and plain technical
difficulties in playing a monitoring or futurism
role (Wolfensberger, 1973). Furthermore it is not
even good enough not to have a conflict of interest;
there must not even be the appearance of conflict
of interest. As they said of Caesar's wife, she must
not only be innocent, she must be above suspicion.
The same applies to advocacy and advocates .
One may very well advocate on behalf of one's
service client, but as a service worker, one should
not be the advocate for that person if one has any
conflicts of interest that are built into the
worker and/or client role. Whether one feels
conflicted or free is totally irrelevant~at
matters is whether the mutual role relationship is
one that is structured so as to have reduced the
potential conflicts to their humanly irreducible
minimum.
Consequently, if one is to have advocacy that
is independent, any such type of advocacy function
needs to be funded from sources not under the control
of people or agencies toward whom advocacy efforts
might be directed. A major rule of thumb is that
advocacy funding sources should be as many links,
steps, levels, etc., removed from potential targets
of advocacy as possible: and/or that as many cushions
and safeguards be interposed between the advocacy
carrier, and the control that potential advocacy
targets can exert over advocacy funds. When advocacy
funds do come from potential advocacy targets, the
"organizational distance" these funds traverse should
be as long as possible, because more safeguards or at
least options can be built in. For example, in one
state, local citizen advocacy services were funded
by a state citizen advocacy office, which was
under the governance control of a state citizen's
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action group, which was funded for advocacy by an
office of state government which was three levels
above the local service level at which citizen
advocates might occasionally confront service agencies
and workers. If such a local agency were inclined
to try to squash advocacy against some of its own practices
then there would be a lot of cooling-off distance
to traverse; and in the meantime, the benefits of
some advocacy actions might be seen as worth the
inconvenience of others because complaints would be
more likely to be perceived systemically, rather than
uniquely one at a time.

Jl 1i
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However, the danger in a state/provincial office
of a voluntary association assuming the advocacy
function when its local units have not made the
commitment to phasing out direct services is that the
state/provincial office may find itself in the
position of conflict with one of its own local
units, and the local unit may cut not only its
affiliation but also its funding to the state/
provincial organization, which may threaten the
survival of the state/provincial organization.
The situation might be tolerable if the serviceproviding units were small, and any conflict with
th8 state/provincial office would not threaten
the survival of the state/provincial organization.
But if local units were large and had a lot of
money, the threat would be powerful. In those
circumstances, perhaps another body would have to
be sought out or created for the advocacy function.
While remoteness of funding is often acceptable,
it is not the most ideal solution. The operation of
an advocacy service is one instance where independence
is the ultimate need. Consequently and optimally,
private funds ought to be used for the private
(or at most quasi-public) operation of many types of
advocacy services, instead of using private funds,
as is often the case now, for services that ought
to be publicly funded and provided as a right. In
New York State, there are private organizations
that go out and raise money to give to the state
institutions that are already funded massively from
the state, to the tune of over $30,000 per resident
per year in some of the worst institutions of the state.
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such use of private funds is a perversion. However,
federal funding of citizen advocacy offices may be
viable because of the remoteness of such funds, even
though the federalization of most other human services
is extremely maladaptive. Also, there are some
instances where an advocacy project may be entered into
by a service provider as long as there is a time-linked
action commitment (not just an intent or promise) to
phase out the clinical service. In such situations,
the conflict dynamics during the phasing out of the
clinical service can be tolerated for perhaps a year
or two.
Elsewhere (Zauha & Wolfensberger, 1973) a number
of mechanisms have been laid out that are apt to
keep unavoidable conflicts of interest created by
funding or administrative/governance structures to
a minimum. A final point of caution here is that
a conflict of interest, or at least a disincentive, may
be created if a protective service is permitted to
charge clients for its services. If one needs a
protective service, one may be reluctant to ask for
it because one (or one's estate) may get charged for it.
4. Because there is an incompatible conflict
of interest between advocacy/protection and social
service delivery, the two need to be organizationally
separate, especially since publicly-funded agencies
are first and foremost the representatives of society,
carry out societally-determined policy, and often
(perhaps even predominatly, not merely occasionally)
do not constitute a primary or even any representation
of a client's interest. Therefore, all advocacy/
protection forms should be administratively and
financially separate from agency structures that deliver
other services, especially clinical ones. Relatedly,
the funding source for advocacy/protection services
should be as far removed (in terms of agencies,
governmental units, levels therein, etc.) as possible.
5. Similarly, many advocacy/protection forms are
incompatible with each other, and need to be separated
at least administratively from each other, even if not
always financially. For example, advocacy on behalf
of an individual is highly distinct from advocacy for
a class of persons. In fact, the interests of an
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individual are not always identical or even compatible
with those of a class to which he/she may be seen as
belonging. However, while individual and collective
advocacy may be able to coexist, more urgent is the
separation of voluntary from paid individual advocacy.
Because of reasons spelled out elsewhere in this paper,
paid personal advocacy will tend overwhelmingly to
drive out volunteer personal advocacy.

,,

6. Some proposed schemas recommended that an
advocacy system be attached to (in the sense of
directed toward) a particular agency or service
structure, such as perhaps a particular residential
institution. But advocacy and protection should
follow the person in need, and not the agency. If
advocacy is attached to a service instead of to a
person, then whenever a person leaves that agency,
that person needs a different advocate, and this
creates yet additional discontinuity in the already
fragmented lives of impaired people. The major
advocacy process needs to be person-tied, and if
there is advocacy built into a particular agency,
then that is additional icing on the cake. Anything
one might want to accomplish by attaching advocacy
to an agency can be accomplished by attaching other
non-advocacy safeguards (such as external evaluation,
as discussed further below) to that agency instead.
7. The least restrictive advocacy/protection
option is preferrable. Among other things, this
implies that where feasible:
a) a citizen-volunteer solution is preferred
to an agency-professional one;
b) an informal (non-legal) option is preferrable
to a legal one.
8. Every person who is impaired in his/her
ability to independently establish a relationship
that offers support, or who is physically or mentally
impaired, who is abandoned, or seriously disadvantaged,
should be assisted in establishing a needed relationship.
More specifically, if a person is a minor, or an
adult with major impairment in competency, such a
person should have an individualized guardian who is
interested in him/her and committed to his/her mission,
and as much as possible free from conflicts of interest.
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Th e guardianship should be of a type that is "minimal,"
1 ,e., commensurate with the needs of the person, but
not more restrictive than need be.
9. There probably cannot be effective and
meaningful self- advocacy in a system that does not
contain strong other-advocacy. One reason is that if
no one has sufficient compassion to advocate for
others, no one will care enough to want to teach
s elf-advocacy to other people. Secondly, a severely
l imited person learns self-advocacy best within the
demanding shelter, protection, love and friendship
of a citizen advocacy relationship, because these
processes are especially apt to bring the person
t oward growth and independence. Thirdly, teaching
people self-advocacy when the teachers do not
practice or believe in other-advocacy is not honest,
and "phony" helping forms rarely work, if ever.
Th erefore, training for self-advocacy should generally
be tied to established and successful citizen advocacy,
and the more so the more impaired the persons in
need of advocacy are. 1bis principle has
particularly forceful relevance in the areas of
mental disorder and mental retardation.
10. Whenever advocacy really begins to work,
i t will be persecuted, because it will be a threat.
Conversely, the phonier an advocacy or protective
system i s , the more likely it is to be praised,
l egitimized, exalted and funded.
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A Classification of Advocacies
The large number of advocacies that have been
defined (or at least "called out") is very confusing,
e.g., what is "systems advocacy," "ombudsmanship,"
"staff advocacy," etc. In order to differentiate the
jungle of advocacy terms, it is proposed that all
advocacies can be classified according to five (or
at least four) criteria.
1. Who is the advocacy for? Some forms of
advocacy are addressed to individuals (citizen advocacy,
Ombudsman, etc.), some to groups (e.g., collective
corporate advocacy for the elderly, such as the
Grey Panthers). Some collective advocacies are
self-help, others are mixed or totally other-directed.
2. What is being advocated for? Some forms
of advocacy are designed to prevent abuse, some
to obtain legal rights, some to implement the
principle of normalization, etc.
3. Who or what is the advocacy aimed "against"?
e.g., the Ombudsman may only investigate public
officials and public services, while specific
watchdog committees may be aimed solely at specific
agencies. This criterion has the lowest identi.ty
of the five, and could conceivably be subsumed
under the second one.
4 . Who is doing the advocating? It might be
an agency via its employees, an independent citizen
volunteer, a collectivity of citizen volunteers, etc.
5. How is the advocacy accomplished or
transacted? Major approaches might be legal means;
"for-speakership," informal personal persuasion, or
other forms of positive social influence; confrontation;
threat; violence and warfare; etc.
Theoretically, then,
a five-dimensional "cube"
could be entered at least
advocating, for whom, and
see
one
not
one
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one could conceptualize
in which all forms of advocacy
three times (who is
how).

The above clarification of terms permits one to
some advocacies in a new light. For instance,
can now perceive that legal advocacy is really
a legitimate concept except when it is used as
methodology within category 1, 2, or 3.

The Four Essential Advocacy/Protection
Components in Relation to the Service System
In order to gain a total overview of all of the
proposed components, the reader should refer repeatedly
to Table 4.
Table 4
The Essential Elements of a
Well-Rounded Advocacy/Protection Schema
in Relation to Other Human Services
Individuals in Need

Human
Services

~

Collective/Systemic Needs

la. Direct Clinical
lb. Planning service
Services via
system development
service agencies,
& administration,
including casework
coordination,
(representing
evaluation
primarily society),
(representing
primarily society).

2.

Independent
5.
citizen advocacy,
local & state/
provincial offices
(representing the
individual person).

3.

Independent
protective service,
local & state/
provincial offices
(representing
society & the
person).

4.

Legislative
public Ombudsman,
state/provincial
office (possibly
regional branches)
(representing both
society & the
person).

Advocacy/
Protection

Indpendent collective
corporate "systems &
collective advocacy"
via staff &
volunteers, state/
provincial office,
possibly locals
(representing groups
in need more than
society).
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To begin, it is necessary to reiterate the
distinction between personal vs. collective, i.e.,
clinical vs. systemic, needs. When a person, as
~ individual, needs a service, protection,
representation, or emotional support, these should
be provided by one or a combination of 1) clinical
service and/or case work agencies, and 2) one of
the individual advocacy/protection forms, such as
citizen advocacy, ombudsmanship, or protective
service, as explained further below. However,
should the person be one of a class of persons with
significant unmet needs, then regardless of whether
any or all of the four functions above come into
play, the functions of collective advocacy and/or
other forms of change agentry should also be available.
The typical non-advocacy human services (healing,
teaching, training, counselling, habilitating,
employing, housing, etc.) should be rendered via
structures (mostly agencies) whose major mandate is
to carry out societal service policy, and who are
funded and regulated accordingly. Especially
professional counselling and case work, regardless of
what it is called, should be vested in service
agencies in which workers are paid to carry out such
a service.
The fact that the above services might be
improved by a consolidation of agencies, and/or by
their much more forceful coordination is important,
but not relevant to the conceptualization of the
schema presented here, except that a major planning
and change agentry function should be vested in
bodies (preferrably and perhaps even essentially
regional in nature) that have various types of
binding authority that will not be explicated
further here.
Ombudsmanship on the Swedish Model
In regard to the four advocacy/protection forms
that are here proposed as "essential," at this point
in time, every state/province should first of all have
or install a generic Ombudsman's office, patterned
after the classical Swedish model. The Ombudsman's
office must be established by law, and should be
attached to the legislature; any citizen should have
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free access to complain about illegal , incorrect,
discourteous, arbitrary or outright corrupt treatment
by any public official. The Ombudsman should have
total access to public documents and officials, the
right to reprimand public officials, and the duty to
report findings and recommendations annually to the
legislature.
The structural characteristics of the Ombudsman's
office include the following. The offi ce is external
to the services its investigates, and is attached by
appointment to the legislative (not the executive)
branch of government. The Ombudsman is protected
by a tenure (usually 5 years) during which time(s)
he/she cannot be fired except by impeachment
procedures similar to those for a superior court
judge. The Ombudsman's office has unlimited access
to public documents, and has subpoena power over
evidence, thus overcoming secrecy that now exists
under the guise of "confidentiality of records."
The office is open and accessible to all citizens.
For example, a prison administration could not censor
a letter written to the Ombudsman's office by a
prisoner. If that letter were opened, the prison
administration would stand in contempt. Preferrably ,
the Ombudsman uses informal, direct, speedy and cheap
methods: conferring with an official, informal
discussions and hearings, etc. Quite often, a letter
of inquiry will settle a problem because officials
will have a healthy respect for the Ombudsman's
office. When the Ombudsman takes a course of action,
there must always be a clear detailed explanation of
the issue. For example, if the Ombudsman reprimands
a public official for being discourteous to
citizens, the Ombudsman would have to explain the
exact basis for the complaint .

,

Common functions of the Ombudsman are the
conduct of impartial and neutral investigations; the
objective evaluation of facts to discover both
justified and unjustified complaints and harassments,
and possibly to defuse unjust allegations; use of
public opinion and of the power of the prestige of
the office, in order to enhance the status or a
complainant (such as a minority member of a handicapped
person) vis-a-vis public structures; and being
sensitive to patterns of problems, and drawing attention
to these patterns.
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The ideal personal characteristics of the Ombudsman
are: independence, both in character and in office;
no conflicts of interest; impartiality ("judicial
temperament") and political neutrality; expertise
regarding the government; tact and diplomacy;
universal accessibility; and a reputation of integrity,
prestige and discretion. This is why traditionally,
the Ombudsman is a person near the end of his/her
career who has no other (e.g., political) ambitions,
and is respected by the public.
The concept of the Ombudsman has deep appeal,
and should be relatively easy to implement, as shown
by the fact that in a relatively short period of time,
many states/provinces have adopted it by law. Also,
one of the benefits of the Ombudsman is that it is a
generic service: a citizen can go with a complaint
against a public human service agency as readily as
one can go with a complaint against any other public
service, such as the sewer system. By being generic,
it defuses the stigma of a great many advocacy
schemas which are either tied unequivocally to
devalued people, or are marginal, such as protective
services. Relatedly, the Ombudsman system benefits
our elephantine society. According to testimony from
Sweden, Swedish democracy might not have worked had
it not been for the institution of the Ombudsman.
The creation of the Ombudsman-is only one of
many safeguards, and would not solve all problems.
One limitation is that the Ombudsman has no administrative
power; he/she cannot tell anybody what to do. The power
of the office is entirely persuasive and revelatory.
The Ombudsman can only reveal and admonish, and make
recommendations to the legislature in a 'yearly
report, which the legislature may either accept or
reject. Also, it has no reach-out mandate, and only
swings into action if citizens call upon it.
Several excellent descriptions and establishment
laws already exist (e.g., the Public Protector law of
Quebec). The point is that such a generic Ombudsman

54

can be utilized on behalf of impaired persons as
much as by anyone else; the regrettable fact is that
in the many states/provinces where this most
valuable resource already exists, hardly any use of
it has been made by or for impaired persons.*
The reader is warned not to confuse or equate
the public legislative Ombudsmanship with Ombudsmanship, i.e., informal "for-speakership," the
establishment of a sort of administrative "inspectorgeneral" for a particular category of agencies
(e.g., nursing homes), or with any number of other
arrangements already discussed (e.g., in-house
staff "advocacy") that have been given the name
"Ombudsmanship."
Citizen Advocacy
Next, citizen advocacy, including its formal versions
(guardianship, etc.) should be vested in inde·pendent
private voluntary action bodies which are incorporated,
and which may not engage in other types of direct
clinical services that might give rise to conflicts
of interest. However, the action body that operates
a citizen advocacy service might conceivably operate
other services that do not constitute a source of
conflict of interest, although this situation would
be unusual, and should be rare. Furthermore, the
action body might be engaged in certain other forms of
advocacy and/or change agentry, although this may
not always be wise. Finally, there is no ideological
(though perhaps there may be a practical) reason
why there may not be a multiplicity of ci-tizen
advocacy services operated by different bodies in
the same region, e.g., citizen advocacy for the
developmentally impaired, for prisoners, etc.
* This was underlined at a meeting of The
Canadian Ombudsmans at the 1976 convention in
Ottawa of the Canadian Association for the
Mentally Retarded. The proceedings are available
on audiotape from the National Institute on
Mental Retardation (4700 Keele St., Downsview
(Toronto), Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3).
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When an individual person needs protection,
spokesmanship, or freely-given expressive support,
the citizen advocacy service should be the first
line of defense to be called upon, except in case
of certain major emergencies discussed below.
Local citizen advocacy offices should be backed
up by a state/provincial citizen advocacy office that
could either be attached to a state/provincial level
citizen action body, or that could be separately
incorporated, perhaps by the local offices, and
governed by representatives from the boards of local
offices.
Empowered Protective Service
While citizen advocacy will furnish the voluntary
personal, and primarily one-to-one, advocacy, the
needed agency advocacy--but still the type of agency
advocacy that tries to be also personal--would be
provided by a protective service agency. A protective
service needs to be defined quite differently if it is
the only protective bulwark in a system than if it is
one component in a global and balanced multi-component
schema. For instance, in a "free-standing" context,
a protective service might be defined similar to the
terms of Helsel (1973): "the paid staff of a (quasi-)
public agency, with or without other service
responsibilities acting as a back-up service, provides
case management, engages in action-oriented advocacy,
exercises legally-sanctioned professional authority,
and has a present readiness to assume legal authority
and responsibility (i.e., guardianship) on behalf of
any minor or impaired adult, on a potentially lifelong basis." According to Helsel, a protective service
worker might provide outreach and prevention, counselling,
coordination of services for individuals (as distinct
from coordinating service systems), tracking and followalong, case auditing, legal intervention, case
management, guardianship, and annual reports to
courts and/or responsible state agencies.
Assuming the presence of the global balanced
schema proposed here, the definition of a protective
service should be changed to the following: "The
paid staff of an independent, legally-sanctioned,
public, quasi-public, or private agency that provides
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no other services, engages in action-oriented advocacy
on behalf of any minor or impaired adult as a backup to citizen advocacy, and has the power and readiness
to assume legal authority and responsibility (i.e.,
guardianship), preferrably on a short-term basis."
Similarly, the functions of protective service workers
would be revised to include outreach; referral of
potential proteges to citizen advocacy; monitoring of
citizen advocacy services; providing individuals in
need, or their families, counselling that is
relatively restricted to protective issues; in
instances in which citizen advocacy is unable to meet
needs, representing individual interests vis-a-vis
service agencies; case tracking and auditing; legal
intervention; guardianship if needed, replacing other
forms of public guardianship; and annual reports as
above, but including the relevant citizen and systems
advocacy offices among its recipients.
The protective service should be publicly
mandated, but not necessarily vested in a public
agency (it might be contracted to a private one). It
would take up where citizen advocacy leaves off,
e.g., it would utilize paid staff to provide advocacy
and guardianship where it is not possible to recruit
citizen advocates, and where the case work of
clinical service agencies appears to be failing or
insufficient. As with citizen advocacy, this function
should not be vested in an agency that is also
responsible for direct clinical services to the people
to whom it might conceivably have to provide
protective services. Furthermore, when a person
appears to be in need of advocacy or protection, the
citizen advocacy office should be the first one to be
invited to enter the case, and only if it fails to
marshall an advocate within a reasonable time period
should it be permissible for the protective service
to enter.
While it is undesirable for a protective service
agency to be a guardian, it is better than having no
guardian at all, or a guardian that is a direct service,
such as an institution. This is ~.hy the law should
permit protective services to be the guardian only for
emergency conditions, or where a citizen advocate
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cannot be recruited to be guardian, as perhaps in some
instances involving a child where adoptive parents
cannot be found.
A special word is in order about the function of
"coordination of services" that is so often written
into protective service legislation or specifications.
The provision that protective services should
coordinate other services could potentially be the
beginning of the substitution of protective service
for direct services--which is one of the perversions
and mis-uses of protective services. Service
coordination is a function of service providers,
not of service consumers, monitors, or advocates.
It is the responsibility of those who have been
given public monies and have been mandated to
provide rational services to provide service
coordination. Protective services should "coordinate"
services only in the sense of coordinating services
to individual lives, which is quite different from
coordinating services systemically. No one can
coordinate services agencies and systems without
having power over them, and that requires legal
enablement on the service system delivery level,
e.g., on the level of the local boards, governmental
units, etc., through whom the money comes. While
protective service needs empowerment for legal
standing, access to clients, emergency intervention
and possibly some forms of guardianship, this form
of empowerment is quite different from the
empowerment needed by regional/local directive,
regulatory and governing bodies to bring rationality
and efficiency to service-providing agencies.
Whether there should be a single generic or
several categoric (i.e., handicap-specific) protective
service agencies in a region can be resolved over
time and experience. At this point, it must be
recalled that single protective service agencies
encompassing all needs and conditions have not really
worked. They are much more likely to work after
strong ideological groundwork has been laid over a
period of years, where numerous safeguards over its
operations exist, and where personnel can be removed
if they lose their dedication and strong commitment
to the client.
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Much like citizen advocacy offices, the
protective service offices could also enjoy the
support of a state/provincial level office.
Corporate Collective/Systems Advocacy
Finally, there is always a need for a collective
corporate advocacy body. In its collective corporate
advocacy, such a body is not concerned with individual
grievances, but with patterns of problems, difficulties,
shortcomings, and possibly with class needs. Since
it is not presently conceivable that a single generic
advocacy body, could address itself to all collective
societal advocacy needs, it will be necessary to have
a relatively large number of such advocacy bodies in
operation, each concerned with a particular need in
society. Thus, there may be a need for a corporate
advocate on behalf of good public government and
citizenship (such as Common Cause), on behalf of
consumer protection and consumer rights (such as
various consumer protection offices or some of the
Nader organizations), and of course on behalf of
any number of disadvantaged or handicapped groups
in society. Ordinarily, where the latter are
concerned, the corporate advocate would probably
be a voluntary association of the affected individuals
themselves, and/or of their friends and relatives,
including ordinary citizens who have developed an
interest in the welfare of the particular group. Of
course, in structuring or carrying out such advocacy,
it must be kept in mind that if the same body also
delivers direct clinical services, that then there
will exist inherent conflict between such services
and the collective advocacy role, although there are
several ways by means of which this conflict can be
somewhat reduced.
Among the roles of collective corporate advocate
bodies should not only be advocacy functions, but also
those change agentry functions that may or may not
be advocacy, or that may be less clearly advocacy
functions. This would include especially the
review of legislation, class action litigation, and
exerting influence on agencies in rigard to general
policies rather than in regard to individual lives
as handled by the Ombudsman, citizen advocacy, or
protective service.
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A corporate collective advocacy function should
exist primarily on the state/provincial level,
regardless of whether local/regional bodies or
branches also exist; and it should be independent of
direct service bodies. Again, if a suitable citizen
action body already exists, it can serve as the governance
carrier of the collective advocacy function. It not,
such a body may need to be established. One example
would be the Center on Human Policy in Syracuse, New
York, although it is primarily locally/regionally
oriented.
GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
Some issues relevant to the governance of advocacy
and protective services have already been covered, as
in the conflict of interest and the immediately
preceding sections. Some additional points must be
mentioned here.
Almost everywhere, a number of corporate
structures suitable for the governance of one or
another of the advocacy and protective services
components already exist, but there are several
potential problem areas that must be considered.
For instance, state/provincial and local offices
of citizen action groups are potential governing
bodies, but may have conflicts of interest. If they
do, they must be willing to divest themselves of the
source of conflict; e.g., if they run direct services,
they might spin them off to other agencies, perhaps
even creating these agencies first. Furthermore, the
desirable corporate structures may already exist,
but not have adequate strength (primarily ideologically
and in terms of governance) to be the locus of an
advocacy function. Thirdly, while. some advocacy forms
may fit into already existing structures, others need
new structures that must yet be created. For example,
it may be that a new structure for a protective
service is needed, and a state/province might contract
with state/provincial and local voluntary agencies to
run it . However, a protective service structure must
be separate from citizen advocacy programs, because of
a recurring and universal temptation to pursue the
conduct of protective or advocacy-type activities by
hiring paid staff rather than by marshalling citizen
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volunteers. The recruitment of such citizen volunteers,
and the supports needed to facilitate the.ir functioning
and perhaps maintain their motivation, are seen as
costly and cumbersome, while paid staff are viewed as
being able to address advocacy issues in an efficient,
competent and ongoing basis. Unfortunately, there is
enough truth to this view that even greater truths have
been overshadowed. These greater truths are that many
advocacy efforts by citizens have infinitely greater
public and social credibility than "bought" advocacy;
and no amount of bought advocacy can really compare in
long-term social value and impact to even a moderately
intense life-long or even long-term commitment to an
advocacy pursuit on the part of an otherwise uninvolved
citizen.
Some advocacy projects have recognized these
truths, and have tried to get the best of both worlds
by utilizing both paid and unpaid advocates. However,
an almost universal dynamic has been revealed by
such efforts: in the short run, paid staff can always
out-perform unpaid volunteers who must also carry out
their other career functions. Thus, the temptation
for paid advocacy staff to attend to all sorts of
advocacy issues themselves, rather than going through
the tedious process of recruiting, marshalling, and
supporting a volunteer advocate, almost invariably has
meant that volunteer efforts have not thrived. What
volunteers may be recruited typically end up as
volunteers to the agency rather than to the person in
need, and they essentially then work for the staff
instead of the other way around. In other words,
staff advocacy and protective services drive out
volunteer advocacy, analogous to clinical services
driving out systemic services, and clinical/personal
advocacy driving out systemic advocacy. Consequently,
of the numerous safeguards that are practically
essential for the operation of all sorts of advocacy
and protection approaches, one is that in a project
attempting to recruit citizen volunteers as individual
advocates, paid staff should be prohibited from
carrying out individual advocacy themselves. Only
such a draconian measure will assure an unequivocal
staff commitment to the recruitment of a volunteer to
tackle an advocacy mission, rather than doing it oneself.
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I highly recommend quasi-public agencies as the
optimal corporate organizational structure for many
services, including protective services. Such
structures are rarely used in human services, but are
most promising, having certain features of private
organizations, but also certain official identities
and sanctions. Many services can then be run without
either governmental or voluntary association
governance, yet both sectors can participate by
contributing members to the governing board. It is
almost a "best of both worlds" solution.
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THE INTERPLAY AMONG THE SERVICE AND
ADVOCACY/PROTECTION COMPONENTS
Optimally, the mutual relationships of the different
components described above would be acknowledged
voluntarily by all the participating bodies, through
the means of written agreements and procedures. On paper,
certain routine processes, operating principles,
standard operating procedures in regard to referrals,
etc., should be a greed upon . This may necessitate the
evolution of a series of agreements over time. Two models
for such agreements in the relationship between citizen
advocacy offices and clinical service agencies are
contained in Wolfensberger and Zauha (1973). More are
needed. Since voluntary agreements will not always be
obtainable, at some point, recourse must be had to power
play, and to coercion via change agentry, and possibly
even legal fiat.
Obviously, in a harmoniously functioning schema,
the components would reinforce and support each other.
For instance, a person's plight might be brought before
the Ombudsman by a citizen advocate or protective service
worker; a person might have both a caseworker and an
' advocate, or an advocate and a protective service worker;
the fact that one protege's problems are shared by many
actual or potential proteges might be brought to the
attention of a collective corporate advocacy body; etc.
In regard to legal advocacy, I propose that it be
conceptualized as functioning primarily in support of
collective/systems advocacy, and of citizen advocacy.
Systems advocacy could mean either a collectivity of
citizens advocating, as a Mental Health Association,
Association for Retarded Citizens, etc., might do, or
an agency with paid employees advocating in such a
fashion as to pursue service system quality.
(The two
might be the same . ) Within that schema of seeing legal
advocacy as part of both systems and citizen advocacy,
I would also advise not to use it more than is
absolutely necessary, and to use it only when other forms
of systems advocacy have failed, employing the persuasive
and other forms first, and legal forms only as a supplementary back-up.
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THE PRIORITIES AMONG THE FIVE COMPONENTS
Priorities must be conceptualized both in the
abstract, as well as specified for a particular point
in time. In a particular North American setting, the
priorities we would assign to the five components
specified above might not necessarily permit us to
infer the "real" time-less priorities they should have.
To perceive these more absolute priorities, one must
almost assume a base-line social situation similar
to "zero-budgeting."
Thus, let us assume that a new nation were formed,
perhaps an underdeveloped one that has few social
structures, or at least few formal arrangements. From
a perspective of building a strategic base for an
adaptive society, I would give first priority--not
to the structured professional-technical services,
as is usually suggested or done--but to a well-funded
citizen advocacy system, unless strong relationships
of this nature were already part of that culture.
Ultimately, human relationships will and must take
precedence over any formalistic structures. Services
where relationships do not, or do no longer, exist or
function are the services of a dead society.
There are other people who believe that informal
relationships are very fragile and untrustworthy.
Such individuals often argue that volunteers might
come in for a while and then drop out, while the
agency, or the professional, or the protective service
"will always be there." There are parents who seek
security for their handicapped children in the brick
and mortar of institutions, on the assumption that
the institution will always be there. I am reminded
of a friend, a parent of a handicapped child, who has
done a great deal to advance the development of public
protective services. She has done so because she
deeply believes in the security and relative permanence
and presence of agencies and paid professionals.
But there is a community in Syracuse that opened
my eyes to the futility of that belief. It consists
in part of a group of non-handicapped people who gave
up much of their middle class lifestyles and accepted
voluntary poverty, moving into a house in the slums
with several homeless and drifting retarded adults.
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Most of the non-handicapped members work, and they
pool their incomes. Some of the handicapped members
also chip in from their earnings or Social Security
payments. This home is not incorporated, is not a
"group home" in the usual sense, and receives no
subsidies or funding. When I remarked on how
fragile the set-up appeared to me, I was jolted
into a new way of thinking by the remarks of one of
the members. She reminded me that our social
systems are collapsing, and that if agencies should
ever be eliminated, and staff and staff salaries
cut, any number of agency services will disappear.
Under severe social stresses, the only thing that
will save handicapped people is community. The
vast majority of human service workers who are paid
to serve handicapped people will no longer be
present once they lose their jobs. Only the people
who really love handicapped people and are prepared
to live with them can offer any assurance of their
survival. What then is more enduring: the salary
of an agency worker, or an intimate intentional
community of voluntary support? All human relationships and structures are transitory. Even paid
involvement is not necessarily more enduring and
secure than personal involvement. Even when their
salary is there, service workers' involvement is
unstable, turnover in human services is very high,
and case records are often records of agency and
worker merry-go-rounds.
I have been involved in the citizen advocacy
movement since the beginning, but there are a number
of things concerning it which have only relatively
recently become clear to me. I am now convinced
that a human service system--even an entire
society--that lacks a significant number of voluntary
one-to-one relationships between citizens and people
in need absolutely will not work, and will collapse.
When people are no longer willing to involve
themselves personally and individually, it is all
over. That is one of the problems we see in some
parts of the country more than others: in some areas,
if someone dies on the street, 3,000 people will
walk over the body but nobody wants to get involved,
no one will bind the wounds.
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There are many people, especially wounded and
handicapped people, who now do not have viable,
relatively unconditional one-to-one supportive
relationships. If people are no longer willing to
engage in those kinds of relationships, laws can be
passed, unlimited funds can be allocated--and still,
nothing will work. That is why organized charity
works so poorly. You can give infinite money to
Goodwill, United Way, the Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities, etc., or even unlimited tax money to the
government for public human services, but if individual
citizens, on~ personal basis, do not bind the wounds
of the sick, do not give bread to the hungry, do not
console the broken-hearted and visit the imprisoned,
do not liberate the captives of oppression and do not
bury the dead, then nothing will work. If everything
has to be bought and people will no longer freely
relate to each other, and especially to handicapped
persons, one can spend $30,000 per person per year
as they do now at Willowbrook (an infamous New York
institution for the retarded), and the service will
still be a snakepit. No amount of laws, agencies,
money and paid staff can replace what Peter Maurin
called "personalism." This is why so many of our
service systems are dysfunctional, such as the
criminal justice and penal system; too much is based
on buying everything. This is why neither public
welfare nor organized private charity has worked very
well; it has been too remote. This also explains
why so little else in our society is working anymore;
it is due to the alienation of our comfort culture
from the inescapable realities of human suffering and
death. This is why elderly people are going into
nursing homes and segregated high-rise apartments and
segregated senior centers, because people do not want
to be close to what they see (often falsely) aging to
be: ugly, unpleasant, full of suffering and death.
And one of the very prophetic messages being
transmitted by and to our culture today is the
fantastically growing wave of crime and violence
against elderly people E.Y_ children. Newspapers are
full of stories of elderly persons being violently
attacked by our children; this has never happened
before in our society, and hardly in any other.
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Thus, because the relationship approach is
fundamental to everything else, I give citizen
advocacy first priority in a conceptual-ideological
sense, and at least up to a level at which advocate
recruiting appears to approach its asymptote.
Volunteer advocacy is the closest thing in our society
to our Judea-Christian ideals. Binding wounds,
visiting the sick, liberating captives, etc . , lose
most of their meaning when they are paid for .
The second most important component in the
schema after citizen advocacy is clinical services.
The rendering of routine clinical services does not
constitute protection, nor should advocacy and
protective services be advanced as a substitute for
such direct services, although in some places this
is exactly what some people are trying to do.
Advocacy can be a partial or occasional substitute
for soft services (e . g.,guidance and counselling),
but absolutely not for hard or direct services:
it is no substitute for being able to go to school,
or having a place to work, or, in a numerical sense,
even for a place to live .
The third most important option is the collectivesystemic advocacy. If the relationships are not there,
this will not work either, but after having reasonable
amounts of both citizen advocacy and clinical services,
this would be the next most valuable addition.
Fourthly, I would opt for Ombudsmanship, and
would ca l l for protective services last. Unfortunately,
I do not know of any protective services system so far
that has worked, and there ought to be a lesson in
that. If schema after schema has failed, we ought to
take a good hard look at the dynamics behind it, because
there must be built-in nonfunctionalities, such as some
of the incompatible functions I have mentioned.
I recognize that the order of importance of the
various components that I have sketched is totally
different from the way most money for services is
spent. Clinical services are usually provided first,
and citizen advocacy last, if at all. Also, I am
certainly not recommending that the above priorities
should be adopted operationally on any local or
state/provincial level. They are only offered as
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principles and systemic concepts. In actual operations,
they might inspire broad goals and strategies, but one
would adopt those operational strategies that are
feasible and promising in a particular setting. For
instance, in a particular state/province, one might
have to give highest priority in a given year to the
legalization and funding of an Ombudsman's office
because the opportunity is golden, other generic
community groups are in support, and the measure has
high likelihood of being accepted if vigorously
advanced. During such a year, the advancement of
citizen advocacy might be placed into a more longterm (perhaps 3-year) strategic track.
Also, it will probably never be possible to
implement all advocacy/protection components at once,
nor is it typically possible to implement even a
single component for equally functional performance
in all parts of a state/province. In almost all
instances, it will be necessary and even desirable
to implement piecemeal, in stages, and typically
with some regions prior to others. Even with state/
provincial level functions (e.g., Ombudsman), it
may be desirable to focus operations initially on one
region, or on a few types of problems, and to add on
as public support, legislative support, funding, staff
and experience increase. Particularly, I suggest
that citizen advocacy and protective services be
implemented in one locale or region at a time,
following the line of least resistance (i.e.,
greatest readiness and support); and even
collective systemic, and legal advocacy methods,
might benefit from regional sequencing of implementation.
Of special impact would probably be the designation
of the most promising locale or region as the pilot
model for a state/province, and to implement there
ahead of everywhere else, and with greatest care
and support. Such a model can be a compelling
persuader for many people, and can serve as a source
of training and even staff spawning ground for other
regions.
Further, a word on the priority of deploying
legal personnel seems in order. As mentioned before,
legal advocacy should be viewed as a method that is
merely one of many methods, used primarily on the
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citizen advocacy, corporate systemic, and to some
degree on the protective service level. Too often,
advocacy is initiated by "hiring a lawyer." Yet
perhaps one of the best ways of utilizing lawyers
is to develop, over a long period of time, a pool
of sensitive, human-service-knowledgeable and
committed local attorneys on both a fee and
voluntary basis. These lawyers would work with
local advocacy bodies or branches, and only as
and if a significant number of legal actions developed
should a full-time attorney be employed at the state/
provincial level, in order to provide back-up and
coordination. In the long run, probably more
community change agentry will be achieved by
working with community lawyers than by specially
hiring them as staff on the local/regional level.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADVOCACY/PROTECTION TO
OTHER SERVICE SAFEGUARDS
The concept of service safeguards has already
been discussed, and I have pointed out that there
are numerous ways of working toward quality of human
services. For instance, sound planning is one of
these, systematization of the legal base is another,
etc. However, a broad band of sound strategies can
be subsumed under the concept of "safeguards," and
all forms of advocacy can really be viewed as
falling into the broader safeguards category. In
our own work, we have differentiated between
safeguards which are external to an agency, even
if they have been internally initiated; and
safeguards which are entirely internal, and are
derived from general principles of organizational
dynamics and self-renewal. In this paper, unless
they are forms of advocacy/protection, none of these
safeguards will be detailed, except that as an
illustration of what we mean by "safeguards," Table
5 lists 21 major external ones, and Table 6 lists
some major internal ones. The reader will find most
of the external safeguards covered in further detail
in Wolfensberger (1973).
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Table 5
Examples of Human Service Monitoring Mechanisms
And Quality Safeguards
That Function External to Agencies or Service Systems
I 1.

2.

•
3.

Requiring Public Mandate
A.

Legislative Mandate & Guarantee Explicitly
Based on Positive Ideology

B.

Resp0nsibility Vested in a "Specialty Point"

C.

Effective Regulatory Control

D.

Funding Made Contingent Upon Externally
Evaluated Performance

E.

Categoric Specialty Services Backing up
Generic Ones

F.

Institutionalization of Legislative Ombudsman
System

G.

Protective Service System as Back-up to
Citizen Advocacy

H.

Prohibition of Secret Transactions

I.

Consumer Participation in Governance

Realizable Through Internal Agency Initiative
A,

Consumer Participation in Governance or
Committees

B.

Recorded Individualized Objectives Reviewed
with Consumer

C.

Routinization of Feedback from Consumers

D.

Formalization of Grievance Management

E.

Independent Advisory Committees

F.

Other Advisory Committees

G.

Routine External Evaluation by Experts

H.

External Consultancy

I.

Written Agreements on Program Operations

Under Control of Voluntary Citizen Action Associations
A.

Citizen Advocacy

B.

Independent Watchdog Committees

C.

Systematic Litigative Probing
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Table 6
Self-Initiatable Internal Organizational
Self-Renewal and Quality Safeguards

1,

2.

3.
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Maintaining Low Internal Boundaries
A.

Adoption of Strategies which Maintain Vitality
and Avoid Age Imbalances in the Power Structure

B.

Legitimization and Institutionalization of
Mutual Internal Critique and Self-Examination
a.

Internal Rotation of Personnel

b.

Regularization of an Objectified
Personnel Review Process

c.

Establishing and Sanctioning Specific
Occasions of Mutual and Self-Critique

d.

Establishing Tenured Internal Freedom-toCritique Positions

e.

Internalization of the Desirability of
Internal Adversary Structures

f.

Regularized Conduct of Internal SelfEvaluation

Weakening of External Boundaries
A.

Recruitment of Highly Diversified Staff

B.

Exchanging Personnel With Other Agencies

C.

Relatively Frequent External Study Tours by
Staff

D.

Bringing in External Study Groups

E.

External Assessment of Performance

F.

Commitment to External Adversary Structures

G.

Internalization of the Desirability of Consumer
Participation on All Levels of the Organization

Fiscal Enablement of Self-Renewal Mechanisms

However, one safeguard principle is relevant here,
and that is the principle of "safeguard redundancy."
This principle calls for the presence of a large number
and variety of safeguards, for the reasons reviewed
below.
~
Any meaningful safeguard will be under pressure, if
, not at one point, then later. Safeguards are
inconvenient, sometimes expensive, and make the lives of
service providers harder. Indeed, the temptation of
some people to want to tie advocacy to particular
agencies rather than to have it function independently,
and/or tied to persons rather than agencies, stems from
the very inability to conceptualize service safeguards
other than advocacy as being legitimate, and constitutes
a very common pressure on safeguards.

Safeguards have to be laboriously planned and
instituted, whereas abuses have a way of arising
instantly. Indeed, there is no limit to the ingenuity
and innovative development of new forms of abuse, and
the best prevention is safeguards which a) are
installed in advance of abuse, and b) are as innovative,
as subtle, and as complex as abuse. By their very
nature, safeguards will not always be functional, as
~ they will invite repression, or have their ups and
, downs for other common reasons. Redundancy provides
a fail-safe and back-up mechanism in case one or
more other safeguards weaken or disappear.
Furthermore, different safeguards accomplish
different missions: some safeguards are for persons,
some for systems; different safeguards function on
different levels of social organization; some
safeguards are internal to the system, some are external
to it; safeguards can be broad or specific; and
different safeguards typically are accessible to
different groups of persons in need.
Finally, safeguards often reinforce each other.
For instance, there may be complementation, as when
an Ombudsman calls upon citizen advocates, or vice-versa.
Also, one safeguard (e.g., a protective service) can
watchdog another (e.g., individual program planning).

ll
,

Thus, for all these reasons, a service system needs
at least eight safeguards, i.e., two for each of the
boxes shown in Table 7.
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Table 7
Examples of Human Service Safeguards
in Two Crucial Dichotomies

Internal
Written Grievance Procedures
Written Individual
For
Objectives
Persons

For
Systems

External
Public Legislative
Ombudsman
Citizen Advocacy

In-House Staff Advocates

Litigative Probing

Routine Feedback
from Clients

Legal Mandate

Consumer & Public
Participation

Legal Prohibition of
Secret Transactions

Permeable Agency
Boundaries

External Consultancy
Advice & Assessment
Funding Tied to
External Assessment
Written Program
Agreements Among
Agencies & Advocacy
Bodies
Citizen Watchdog
Committees
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Some safeguard mechanisms can be implemented without
any law whatsoever, such as many types of consumer
participation, routinization of feedback from consumers
and all internal safeguards. All that is needed is the
will of the agency; at the most, it will cost money.
Other external safeguards will require a public mandate,
such as making funding contingent upon externally
evaluated performance. There are only three external
safeguards which are under voluntary association control,
and because there are so few, voluntary associations
need to hold on to these.
The difference between safeguards for persons
versus for systems is particularly important. What is
good for the service system is not necessarily good
for the service clients, and vice versa, as previously
mentioned.

75

THE LIMITATIONS OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION
As mentioned before, it is unlikely that all
desirable safeguard measures will be implemented at
once. In fact, I do not even expect that we will often
see them all existing and actually functioning as
intended, even in the future. It is therefore important
to exercise that
rare discernment and judgement
as to what is possible, what is feasible now, what is
justified to try and risk, what is compromisable and
what is not, etc. Here, we offer a few reflections and
guidelines.
One very realistic objection that may be raised
against advocacy/protection efforts is that the
proliferation of advocacy actions and other service
safeguards can be very expensive not only as regards
the funding of these efforts themselves, but also in
regard to the cost of the changes that advocates may
be pursuing. Relatedly, as discussed at great length
in another paper (Wolfensberger, in press), cultural
values may be so strongly opposed to certain changes
that some types of advocacy actions may re f lect poorly
advised priorities, or would not be actualizeable
even if sustained by laws and court decisions. The
same may occur if the technical prerequisites and
knowledge for the implementation of an advocated
outcome simply do not exist.
One might well speculate what the optimal outcome
might be in a society that had a superb continuum of
comprehensive services, active citizen involvement in
the political and service process, and all the advocacy
and protection safeguards and mechanisms conceptualized
in this paper. The outcome one would envision would
almost certainly depend upon one ' s world view and one's
perception of human nature. I propose that under
those conditions, there would still be a great deal
of human suffering, there would still be abuses, there
would still be people falling between the cracks, and
there would still be loneliness, alienation, and misery.
No matter what is done, even if one has all the
money in the world and the best staff, "nothing will
work." Problems will not be solved, there will still
be organizational problems and strife. Once one has
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accepted this reality, one sees goals in human services
quite differently. It then becomes a question of doing
those things which maximize the likelihood of good
things happening, and minimizing those things that
increase the likelihood of bad things happening. There
are no human solutions to human problems, nor are there
, agency or legal solutions. Thus, our aspirations
should not be for a utopia, and we should not put our
hopes in the belief that improvements in human service
technology, and even human seFVice or societal ideology ,
will solve all problems and dry all tears. Instead, a
reasonable ideal is to pursue the implementation of a
system that incorporates ideologies that are as
positive as very weak human beings are able to adopt,
and to operationalize strategies which are at least
sound in principle even though not perfect in practice ,
Students in human service training come in very
enthusiastic and idealistic, and if they cannot find
a solution to something , they do not want to bother
with it. They think it is not worth it. But if
something is worth doing, it is worth doing even if one
does not succeed. The important thing is to become
engaged in the struggle, even though it may be
terribly frustrating. Some people never learn this
lesson, or see the relative futility of human efforts.
It is ironic that it has not been recognized that
throughout human history, there has neither been a
change in human suffering (only in its types and
sources), nor an acceptance of this fact. But once
it is accepted, one can become free to do the right
thing. The right thing may often be the thing that
does not work, and one can only decide to do the
right thing when one accepts the fact that it may
not work, That is why so many people cannot and
do not . do the right thing; that is why compromise
is the role in human services. So many human service
professionals do things which are not consistent with
the ideals with which they came into the field--not
because they do not know the right thing to do , but
because they could not accept the cost.
Thus, even if everything, including funding and
coordination, has been done optimally, our "ideal"
, service structures are still going to be poor. There
will still be problems and weaknesses, because
~
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the human condition is such that the "least worst"
alternative is the best that is ever likely to be
attained.
The above is not an apology for mediocrity,
but a caution against the apparently never-ending
North American belief that the next round of
technical developments will bring the answer to our
problems. Even the best advocacy/protection system
we are ever likely to see will merely improve our
likelihood of attaining that "least worst" nervice
configuration.
Somewhat on the other extreme, many states in
the United States are now scrambling to comply with
the requirements of the Developmental Disabilities
Act for advocacy provision, but what is lacking
in this scramble is an internalization of the
underlying issues. If the issues are not understood,
the programs that are implemented or funded will not
work, and we are more apt to get more of the same
"much much worse than least worst" conditions such
as we have had. In most states, the advocacy system
probably will not work because the approach is a
mechanistic-technological rather than ideological
one. Also, an advocacy and protection system should
not be looked upon merely as a response to a federal
law to get money. Instead, it should be viewed as
being, in its own right, an essential component of a
well-rounded service system approach.
Thus, the "least worst" situation should not be
viewed as being the worst that could happen. Things
could be much worse! Should cultural morality and
values suffer such extensive collapse that most
social transactions end up being placed on a conflict
and confrontational model rather than a cooperative
one, then no amount of formalization and regulation of
the modes of conflict and confrontation will bring
about societal viability. Instead, a situation will
be brought about where there is a great diffusion and
proliferation of powers to block the actions of other
individuals and organizations, but where there will
not exist sufficient concentration of constructively
directed powers to accomplish the positive things that
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are needed. In many ways, our society is rapidly
approaching this point, and advocacy/protection
systems that are based on improper ideologies, or that
fail to arrest the ideological deterioration in our
society, will be merely systems-disabling rather than
client-enhancing.
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FURTHER RESOURCES
For further resources on the whole issue of social
advocacy and Ombudsmanship, the reader may request
assistance from the author (Wolf Wolfensberger, The
Training Institute for Human Service Planning Leadership and Change Agentry, 805 South Crouse Avenue,
Syracuse, New York 13210) in the form of course and
resource packages that have been developed for this
purpose. Included in these resources are bibliographies
and reading lists, social advocacies quiz items, and
directions to yet additional sources.
In Canada, the reader may request assistance from the
Association Resources Division of the Canadian Association
for the Mentally Retarded, Kinsmen NIMR Building,
York University Campus, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview,
Ontario, M3J 1P3.
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